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ABSTRACT 
The external networks of directors significantly impact firm value and 
decisions. Surrounding close gubernatorial elections, local firms with directors 
connected to winners increase value by 4.1% over firms connected to losers. 
Director network’s value increases with network strength and activities, and is not 
due to network homophily. Connected firms are more likely to receive state 
subsidies, loans, and tax credits. They obtain better access to bank loans, borrow 
more, pay lower interest, invest and employ more, and enjoy better long-term 
performance. Network benefits are concentrated on connected firms, possibly 
through quid pro quo deals, and unlikely spread to industry competitors. 
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“The point about Connectors is that by having a foot in so many different worlds, 
they have the effect of bringing them all together.” 
Malcolm Gladwell – The Tipping Point 
1. INTRODUCTION
In their seminal paper, Fama and Jensen (1983, page 311) characterize the board of 
directors as “the common apex of the decision control system.” As a crucial internal corporate 
governance device, the board’s main tasks are to monitor the managers and to provide them with 
strategic advice. During the last three decades, the corporate governance literature has provided 
rich evidence on many aspects of internal board monitoring and advisory activities. Yet, relatively 
little is known on the impact of the board’s interactions and connections with different outside 
economic agents on firm value and corporate decisions.1 
Board members, who are typically experienced and powerful managers, businessmen, and 
successful professionals, are likely to be well connected people in the center of important 
business and social networks.2 The scope of their activities and the depth of their relationship 
certainly lie beyond the boardroom. Do directors’ external social networks impact firm value and 
corporate decisions such as financing and investments? If yes, what are the potential channels? 
In this paper, we attempt to answer these important questions, focusing on one aspect by which 
directors add value to firms: they serve as connectors to external environments. 
The outside network of directors can be complex, extensive, and difficult to account for. 
They can take many forms, including, for example, the ‘old boys’ networks from former schools, 
connections through employment, ties from political affiliation, hobbies, and clubs, or 
memberships of religious and charitable organizations. Hence, our first challenge is to identify 
one broad and representative type of director networks for our study. For reasons similar to 
Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008), Fracassi and Tate (2012), Nguyen (2012), Engelberg, Gao, 
and Parsons (2013), Shue (2013), Do et al. (2014), and Ishii and Xuan (2014), among others, we 
study the external networks of board members based on their educational links. First, 
connections between alumni predate our sample’s period for years, if not decades, are 
unambiguously defined based on publicly available information on all directors, and are less 
prone to network endogeneity issues. Second, educational links are broad enough to be 
                                                 
1 See Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010) for a survey of literature on the board of directors.   
2 Among U.S. nonfinancial firms, Guner, Malmendier, and Tate (2008) show that 44% of board members 
are outside directors who are executives at a nonfinancial firm; 18% are executives at a financial firm; and 10% are 
from non-corporate backgrounds. See Allen and Babus (2009) and Jackson (2014) for a literature review on social 
networks in finance and economics. 
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representative of directors’ social ties, making it possible to generalize the empirical results to 
other networks of directors. Third, alumni networks also play a particularly important role in the 
American society. Educational institutions received as much as $41.67 billion in 2010, or 14% of 
all charitable donations, second only to religious organizations (Giving USA Foundation, 2011.)3  
As highlighted in the literature, network connections can impact firm value and decisions 
in a number of ways. They might provide the firm with information advantages that ultimately 
improve business decisions (e.g., Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008). They can also help the firm 
via direct deals to obtain business contracts or better financing terms (e.g., Faccio, Masulis, and 
McConnell 2006; Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2013; Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons, 2012). While 
our results are consistent with both channels, we focus on the latter. To identify the impact of 
director networks, our empirical approach relies on close gubernatorial elections that involve the 
alumni networks of local firms’ directors and election candidates, for the following reasons. 
First, we expect strong impacts of directors’ connections within the world of state 
politics, commonly known as prone to illicit deals (as reported by Glaeser and Saks, 2006, among 
others.) Powerful local politicians such as governors are less likely placed under the intense 
scrutiny faced by federal politicians, thus can enjoy more leeway to provide support to local 
connected firms (see evidence for example in Do et al. 2014.) Second, with respect to the 
methodology, close elections can be considered a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), a 
natural experiment of near-randomized-trial internal validity (Lee 2008) that has recently gained 
popularity in corporate finance. 4  Accordingly, a corporate connection to a narrowly elected 
contender is at the limit identical to a connection to a narrowly defeated contender. The 
inclusion of highly visible candidates such as Janet Napolitano in our sample suggests that our 
estimate covers a broad share of the population of gubernatorial contenders and connected firms. 
We build our sample from many data sources. We first obtain past education history for 
directors of public firms in the U.S. from BoardEx of Management Diagnostics Limited. Data 
on gubernatorial elections from 1999 to 2010 are downloaded from official state election 
websites. We compute the vote margin between the winner and the runner-up, and only retain 
                                                 
3 Alumni ties can be primordial in the development of professional relationships by providing mutual trust 
and common access to the same social network (e.g., Lerner and Malmendier 2013). Measurement errors of alumni 
links as friendships would produce an attenuation bias against finding positive and significant effects of friendships. 
4 Examples include Chava and Roberts (2008), Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012), and Kerr, Lerner, and 
Schoar (2014). Roberts and Whited (2013) provides a review on the RDD and other solutions to endogeneity issues. 
We detail the methodology in section 2 and the appendix, and show that this cross-sectional identification method 
possesses several advantages over the traditional event study method. 
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observations in which this margin is less than 5% of their total votes (therefore less than 5% of 
the total vote turnout including all other candidates). 
We manually collect details of all contenders’ educational backgrounds from the web 
archives of their campaigns, a process made difficult by the search for less prominent defeated 
candidates. Following Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008), we classify the university degree 
programs into six categories that include Undergraduate, MBA, Masters, Medical, PhD, and Law. 
Using these degrees, we form all pairs between directors and a close gubernatorial election’s top 
two contenders (elected or defeated) who graduated from the same university campus and the 
same degree program and within five years of each other. This matching process using common 
educational link provides us with a sample of connected firms. 
To increase the likelihood of real network interactions between firms and their 
connected gubernatorial candidates, we further require connected firms be headquartered either 
in the election state or within 500 miles from the election state’s capital. As a result, we obtain a 
sample of local connected firms defined as 1) having at least one director who graduates from the 
same university campus and the same university degree as one of the close election’s top two 
contenders, within five years of difference; and 2) being headquartered either in the election state 
or within 500 miles from the election state’s capital.5 
We conduct our empirical analysis of the impact of director networks on the sample of 
local connected firms that includes 516 unique firms, 694 connected firm-years, and 483 unique 
directors from 1999 to 2010. We calculate stock price cumulated abnormal return (CAR) of each 
connected firm around the date of the related candidate’s close election. Our main RDD 
nonparametric specification is implemented in a kernel-weighted regression of a connected firm’s 
CAR on the treatment variable Winner, an indicator equal to one if a connected contender wins a 
close election, zero otherwise. 
Our first finding is the positive and significant impact of the external networks of 
directors on firm value. Around the election day, local firms connected to the winner experience 
a positive and significant average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of 4.1% above the CAR of 
local firms connected to a closely defeated contender. It is an increase in firm value of $211.7 
million and $27.4 million for our sample’s average and median firms, respectively. This result 
                                                 
5  Our definition of local connected firms relies on an extensive finance literature on the impact of 
geographic distance. For example, Coval and Moskowitz (1999) find that an average investment manager is 1,654 
km away from securities he holds and 1,814 km away from his benchmark portfolio. Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) 
define individual investors’ local investments as the ones in firms that are 250 miles from their home. As reported in 
Table 3 and appendix table A5, our results remain robust to various geographic distance and winning vote margins. 
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remains robust to a battery of robustness tests, including RDD randomness checks, inclusion of 
various observable variables, alternative samples, different levels of standard error clustering, and 
alternative specifications in the event windows and in the market models. 6 
As surveyed by Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010), the corporate finance literature 
has paid most attention to the monitoring and advisory roles of corporate boards, which are 
limited to activities within the boardroom. In contrast, our paper examines the importance of 
directors as connectors to the world outside the board. It relates to the recent and growing 
literature on the board’s external ties and their impact on corporate decisions. For example, 
Cohen, Frazzani, and Malloy (2008) show the impact of fund managers’ connections to CEOs of 
portfolio companies on their investments. Butler and Gurun (2012) show that mutual fund 
managers’ connections to CEOs affect executive pay policies. Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons 
(2012) find that firms connected to bank officers enjoy reduced interest rates, better credit 
ratings, and performance. Ishii and Xuan (2014) show that board connections negatively impact 
abnormal returns to acquirers and merged entities. Closest to our paper’s spirit is Engelberg, Gao, 
and Parsons (2013) who find a positive impact of the size of CEOs’ external networks on CEO 
compensation. Beyond the business world, our paper highlights directors’ crucial, value-
enhancing role in connecting firms with the broader society, and in our case the world of local 
politics. Our result thus adds to Goldman, Rocholl, and So’s (2009, 2013) findings on the 
corporate benefits of directors who are former politicians and bureaucrats.7 
In contribution to this literature, our empirical approach provides an identification 
solution, namely the RDD of close elections, to the endogeneity of directors’ external 
connections. By relying on a near-randomized natural experiment, we also circumvent the 
shortcomings of typical event studies that cannot measure unobserved prior probabilities of 
events (Snowberg, Wolfers, and Zitzewitz 2011). 
Our second finding is how the characteristics of the social networks of directors affect 
firm value. Consistent with network theories, stronger and more active connections between a 
director and an elected governor are more valuable. This evidence contributes to the growing 
                                                 
6 In event studies, a common concern is the potential cross-sectional correlation in abnormal returns. Our 
RDD specification guarantees the near-random nature of the winning status, thus the independence of all winners’ 
identity. The potential bias in standard errors is further addressed by appropriate clustering at many levels. In 
addition, we restrict the sample on firms located in or close to each election state. 
7 Other than connections via directors, the value of political connections to firms has been studied in 
various contexts. See for example Fisman (2001), Faccio (2006), Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006), Cooper, 
Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2010), among others. In section 6.5, we discuss one type of connections based on 
campaign contributions, and show that they do not affect our main results. 
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literature on the impact of social networks in finance, such as Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 
(2008), Hwang and Kim (2009), Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007, 2010), Kuhnen (2009), 
Fracassi and Tate (2012), Nguyen (2012), Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons (2012, 2013), Kramarz 
and Thesmar (2013), Ishii and Xuan (2014), Fracassi, forthcoming, and Schmidt, forthcoming, 
among others. Prior literature, with the exception of Lerner and Malmendier (2013) and Shue 
(2013), often considers social networks as exogenous, and does not address the homophily 
nature of social networks, by which connected people often share similar characteristics. Our 
results remain robust after controlling for this potential concern using an extensive set of fixed 
effects. 
Our third finding relates to the concrete mechanisms by which firms directly benefit 
from the external networks of directors. When directors are connected to governors, their firms 
are 5.1% more likely to receive state subsidies, 4.4% more likely to receive state loans, and 5.6% 
more likely to receive state tax credits, and the tax credits received increase by $330,000 on 
average. The direct benefits are local: they are stronger in more corrupt, more regulated, and 
bigger-government states, while we find no evidence on federal subsidies. Connected firms enjoy 
better access to bank loans, borrow more, and pay lower interest rate. They also invest more in 
capital and in staff hiring and achieve better accounting and stock long term performance. 
Moreover, controlling for broad-based channels such as lobbying for industry-specific policies, 
we find that the connected firms’ benefits are largely concentrated on the connected firms, 
possibly in quid pro quo deals. 
Extant empirical evidence of the real corporate benefits of director networks remains 
scant. One exception is Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2013), who found the impact of former 
Republican/Democrat politicians on corporate boards on firms’ government contracts. Our 
paper thus contributes to the literature by providing a wide range of real benefits firms can enjoy 
thanks to director networks. 
Admittedly, firms are embedded in many complex networks, of which director networks 
are only one type. Our paper’s findings contribute to the literature on social networks of firms in 
general, and calls for further theoretical and empirical research on how those various networks 
are formed, and influence corporate decisions and performance.  
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 detail the 
methodology and the data, respectively. Section 4 reports the empirical results. Section 5 
explores possible interpretations and channels of the results. Section 6 reports robustness checks. 
Section 7 concludes. 
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2. IDENTIFICATION AND EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
2.1 REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY DESIGN OF CLOSE ELECTIONS 
In our election-based experiment, an estimation of the impact of director networks on 
firm value should overcome a reverse causation channel when a well-performing firm may be 
able to help its connected contender win an election, or an omitted variable bias when connected 
firms and contenders are affected by the same unobservable factor, such as a shift in public 
opinion. The reverse causation and endogeneity bias are best eliminated with a randomization of 
the assignment of would-be governors to office. If the contender is chosen randomly, no 
concern exists about either the reverse causation of firm value changes or the influence of some 
omitted variables. It is, however, extremely difficult to find a randomized experiment.  
Lee’s (2008) work on Regression Discontinuity Designs (RDD) proves that, when vote 
shares approach the threshold of 50%, the event of winning is practically randomized between 
the winner and the loser. Therefore, conditional on the election being close, the incidence of 
winning or losing is independent of all observable and unobservable characteristics of the 
contender before the election.8 The RDD thus allows an estimation of the average treatment 
effect of connections to elected contenders versus defeated ones without reverse causation or 
omitted variable bias, ensuring the design’s internal validity. Results from the RDD are also 
externally valid and generalizable. Lee and Lemieux (2010) shows that the RDD estimate is ex 
ante informative for all elections, as it can be interpreted as a Weighted Average Treatment 
Effect (WATE) of being connected to a winner, where each candidate’s weight is her ex ante 
likelihood to be in a close gubernatorial election, thus nontrivial for most candidates. Even very 
powerful candidates can be subject to close gubernatorial elections, e.g., Arizona’s Janet 
Napolitano in 2002.9 
Our identification strategy has a key advantage in comparison with event studies. 
Traditional event studies rely on the event’s exogeneity and the accuracy of the market’s prior 
beliefs, unavailable except in prediction markets (see discussions in Fisman 2001, and Snowberg, 
Wolfers, and Zitzewitz 2011). In contrast, our design is always valid even if the market’s prior 
                                                 
8 Lee’s (2008) interpretation of RDD with a very weak identification condition builds on earlier formal 
work by Hahn, Todd, and Vander Klauw (2001) and Thistlewaite and Campbell’s (1960) intuition. The online 
econometric appendix presents more details on the method used in this paper. 
9 In response to Caughey and Sekhon’s (2011) critique of possible non-randomness of winners in close 
election, Eggers et al. (2015) shows that overall there is no evidence of sorting in a large sample of close elections. 
Appendix tables A1 and A2 provide extensive robustness checks on randomness and RDD required conditions. 
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belief is largely incorrect. To illustrate this point, suppose that the market value of connection to 
a candidate P is $100 in case he wins, and zero otherwise. Prior to the election, if the market 
believes he already has a winning probability of 65%, pre-election connection must be priced by 
the market at $65. The post-event market reaction to a realized win is $100-$65=$35, and that to 
a realized loss is -$65. An event study of election wins would report an underestimated value of 
connection of only $35. The bias comes from pre-event expectation of election results. In 
contrast, RDD estimation always produces correctly the difference of $35-(-$65) = $100, exactly 
the right value of having a connection to an elected governor. Hence, while we still use CARs to 
improve estimation efficiency by reducing market noises, it is not essential to our results, thanks 
to the near-random nature of RDD assignments (see appendix for more details.) 
Another key advantage of our cross-sectional identification comes from the aggregation 
of firm-relevant information during election day. Market reaction on election day may 
incorporate news that can be informative of a firm’s future performance, such as potential 
changes in industrial regulations, macroeconomic policies, or government spending. An event 
study needs to assume that no other relevant news takes place on the same day. This assumption 
is untenable, because there are usually many other elections on the same day as a gubernatorial 
election, including potentially the presidential election (during a presidential election year). In 
contrast, interactions between concurrent elections cannot affect RDD’s only necessary 
identification condition that the density of vote shares is continuous around the 50% threshold 
(details in appendix). Therefore, even in presence of concurrent elections, a candidate’s winning 
status in RDD is always near-random and independent of all other same-day news. The correct 
identification of the value of connection is thus guaranteed. In addition, to reduce the noises that 
concurrent elections could create, we restrict the sample to firms located in or close to each 
election state. Finally, since firms connected to different candidates may experience correlated 
shocks on the election day, we perform extensive corrections for standard error clustering. 
In our specification, each observation represents a connection between a local firm’s 
director and a close-election’s top-two candidate through a specific university program for a 
given election year. The dependent variable is a connected firm’s cumulated abnormal return 
(CAR) in a window around the election day. We thus combine the strength of event studies with 
RDD to reduce market noise in stock returns. The treatment variable Winner is an indicator equal 
to one if a firm is connected to the winner and to zero if a firm is connected to the loser. 
We estimate 𝛽𝑅𝑅𝑅  nonparametrically by local polynomial regression of the following 
equation, using Gaussian kernel function (details are described in Imbens and Lemieux 2008): 
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𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖 + 𝑷𝒘(𝑉𝑉𝑖 − 50%)𝟏{𝑉𝑉𝑖≥50%} + 𝑷𝒍(𝑉𝑉𝑖 − 50%)𝟏{𝑉𝑉𝑖<50%} + 𝜀𝑖, 
where 𝑷𝒘(. ) and 𝑷𝒍(. ) are two different second degree polynomials of vote share 𝑉𝑉𝑖  to be 
estimated. The method is implemented by a Gaussian-kernel weighted OLS with the two 
polynomial controls, and a bandwidth equal 0.005. It is equivalent to estimating 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖 =
𝐹(𝑉𝑉𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖 separately on both sides of the threshold, and taking the difference of 𝐹�+(50%) −
𝐹�−(50%). In robustness checks, we use different specifications of the polynomials, a wide range 
of bandwidths, and also check Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik’s (2014) correction. 
For inferences, the regression directly yields 𝛽𝑅𝑅𝑅� ’s standard error (Imbens and Lemieux 
2008), corrected for clustering at the state level to be most conservative, since the main regressor 
Winneri varies by each politician-election year combination, and that one needs to take into 
account potential autocorrelation over time (see appendix and Cameron and Miller 2011). In 
particular, this strategy permits arbitrary correlation of the error terms related to each state’s 
specific election, especially important under concurrent elections. In robustness checks, we use 
different levels of clustering and two-way clustering. 
2.2 IDENTIFYING MECHANISMS: NARROW VERSUS BROAD TARGETING, AND HOMOPHILY 
Since corporate directors’ links to elected governors are identified as an almost-random 
treatment in our context, their effects on firm outcomes are causal. It still remains to understand 
whether the potential benefits are targeted towards a specific director in a specific firm, or they 
also spread broadly among same-school alumni and same-industry firms in general. Narrowly-
targeted benefits are common in cases of quid pro quo deals, but could also arise when a targeted 
firm takes advantage of privileged information thanks to its connection to the governor. Those 
benefits are likely linked to corruption, understood as the abuse of public office for private 
gains. 10  They are categorically different from broad-based benefits, which relate to several 
mechanisms, including lobbying by groups of firms for a specific policy that affects an industry, 
and pork-barrel politics of favoritism towards constituencies. 11  We will focus on identifying 
whether a large share of firms’ benefits from director networks are narrowly targeted. 
                                                 
10 For most recent economic studies on favoritism targeted towards specific regions, ethnic groups, or 
remote families, see Hodler and Raschky (2014), Burgess et al. (2015), and Do, Nguyen, and Tran (2016). 
11 See Grossman and Helpman (2002) for a survey on lobbying, and Harstad and Svensson (2011) for a 
theory of the consequences of the difference between lobbying and bribery. Pork barrel politics is surveyed in 
Golden and Min (2013).  
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Broad-based benefits are also related to the homophily nature of social networks, by 
which connected people often share similar characteristics. This mechanism, commonly present 
in most network studies,12 works as follows. Would-be governors and directors sharing similar 
characteristics and preferences, say, ardent interests in military studies, may have been drawn 
together at the same university with strength in that discipline. Decades later, the director now 
sits on a military firm’s board, and the elected governor may enact policies in favor of the 
defense industry, thus favorable to the director’s firm. Similar to the lobbying mechanism, 
network homophily would typically produce a broad-based effect that should be detectable 
across all alumni from the same school, or all firms in the industry. 
We use two sets of interacted fixed effects to control for broad-based benefits. First, 
according to lobbying and favors based on school-related interests (or school-based homophily), 
a director’s firm should still expect the same benefits from an alumni governor, even if he is 
from a remote class. Hence, we control for a dummy variable 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠 equal to one if 
and only if any alumnus from the director’s university s wins an election at the same time t. Its 
coefficient captures the average effect of any winner among same-school alumni. To allow 
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠’s effect to vary across universities, we interact it with a set of university fixed 
effects 𝜃𝑠. Second, lobbying activities usually target policies that broadly affect an industry. We 
thus control for a dummy variable 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑘𝑠 equal to one if and only if some firm in the 
same industry of the director’s firm is connected to a winner in election year t, so that its 
coefficient captures the average effect of any winner connected to the firm’s industry. To allow 
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑘𝑠 ’s effect to vary across industries, we interact it with a set of industry fixed 
effects 𝜁𝑘 . 
The two sets of interacted fixed effects will capture broad-based benefits, and the 
remaining coefficient 𝛽 shows how much the effect is narrowly targeted to a specific firm: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑠 + 𝑷𝒘(𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑠 − 50%)𝟏{𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖≥50%} + 𝑷𝒍(𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑠 − 50%)𝟏{𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖<50%}+𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠𝜃𝑠 +𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑘𝑠𝜁𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠. 
In summary, our research design identifies and consistently estimates the WATE of 
being connected to a candidate in a gubernatorial election, where the effect is averaged with 
                                                 
12 See review of the problem in McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook (2001). Exceptions include studies 
with randomized and quasi-randomized group formation, such as Lerner and Malmendier (2013), Shue (2013), 
Carrell, Sacerdote, West (2013), and Algan et al. (2015). 
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weights over the sample of all candidates who stand a chance of experiencing a close election, 
and all listed firms. We can further separate narrowly targeted benefits for specific connected 
firms from broad-based benefits that are usually due to lobbying and homophily. 
3. SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
Our sample is constructed using data from several sources. First, we obtain biographical 
information and past education history for directors and senior company officers from BoardEx 
of Management Diagnostics Limited. The data details the relational links among board directors 
and senior company officers for both active and inactive firms by cross-referencing these 
directors’ and officers’ employment histories, educational backgrounds, and professional 
qualifications. In particular, the data contain current and past roles of each official in a company, 
with start and end date (year), all undergraduate and graduate degrees attained, the year in which 
those degrees were awarded, and the awarding institution. We restrict our sample to board 
directors in U.S. publicly listed firms. Our sample starts in 1999 because Boardex starts providing 
data on director networks from 1999 and ends in 2010 because we need to track corporate 
outcomes a few years after 2010.  
Next, we collect the gubernatorial election results from state official election websites 
from 1999 to 2010. For each election, we identify the candidate finishing first (the winner) and 
second (the loser) and calculate their margin of votes. A close election is specified by a winner-
loser margin of vote shares of less than 5%, when their vote shares are calculated both as 1) a 
fraction of all-candidate total votes; and 2) a fraction of the top two candidates’ total votes, 
respectively.13 Although it is frequent that a close gubernatorial election has many candidates 
(with a maximum of 15 candidates in Tennessee’s gubernatorial election in 2002, as reported in 
appendix table A1), the two top contenders across all close elections obtain the lion share of 
votes, totaling on average 94.22%, leaving only 5.78% for all other candidates.   
We hand-collect the biographical record of these elections using Marquis Who’s Who 
biographies, which contain active and inactive biographies from the Who’s Who publications. Our 
scope of search includes biographies in (i) Who’s Who in American Politics, (ii) World Almanac of 
U.S. Politics, and (iii) The Almanac of American Politics. For each candidate, Who’s Who biographies 
provide a brief vita, including the candidate’s employment history, all undergraduate and 
                                                 
13  We drop three elections from our sample (New Hampshire in 2000, California in 2002, and 
Massachusetts in 2002) because their winner-loser margin of vote shares based on total vote turnout of all 
candidates is smaller than 5%, but greater than 5% when based on the total votes of the top-two contenders. 
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graduate degrees attained, the year in which those degrees were awarded, and the awarding 
institution. Most of the biographies for our sample are available in Who’s Who. To complete our 
biographies, we use candidates’ archived websites, and other sources on the World Wide Web. 
We retain entries for which we can positively identify the contender.  
We construct our social network measure through educational institutions. We define a 
connection as a link between a local firm’s director and a close gubernatorial election’s contender 
who both graduate from the same university, the same campus, and the same degree (program) 
within five year. Our degree definition is based on Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) who 
group all degrees into six categories: (i) business school (Master of Business Administration), (ii) 
medical school, (iii) general graduate (Master of Arts or Master of Science), (iv) Doctor of 
Philosophy, (v) law school, and (vi) general undergraduate.14 We thereby match institutions and 
degrees on Who’s Who biographies and BoardEx. Finally, we match our data to stock return data 
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
Table 1 reports the time series and details of all U.S. gubernatorial elections and the close 
ones between 1999 and 2010. The average annual number of gubernatorial elections is 13.08 
(with a maximum of 37, median of 7, and minimum of 2). The average annual number of close 
elections is 2.83 (with a maximum of 11, median of 1, and minimum of 0). Out of 157 
gubernatorial elections, we identify 34 close ones (20.5% of the total elections). No trend seems 
to appear in the relationship between the number of elections and the number of close elections. 
The average vote margin across all close elections is 2.6%. Appendix table A1 reports further 
details of all close elections in our sample that include the names the top two candidates, the 
number of candidates, the election state, and the party affiliation, the total vote turnout, the two 
contenders’ vote shares and former schools and universities.  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Table 1 also provides the time-series distribution of firms in our sample. These local 
connected firms are defined as the ones that 1) have at least one director who graduates from the 
same university campus and the same university program within five years of difference as one 
of the close election’s top two contenders; and 2) are headquartered either in the election state or 
                                                 
14 Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) also provide the backgrounds and rationale for the importance of 
educational links in the U.S. and of each degree in their classification. For example, although there might be more 
students in an undergraduate program, networks from undergraduate studies remain a powerful. Subsequently, the 
literature thus essentially uses the same education-based network measure.   
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within 500 miles from the election state’s capital.15 Our corporate geographic requirement aims 
at potential real network interactions between local firms and their connected gubernatorial 
candidates. However, as we show later, our results are robust to alternative geographic distance.  
As reported in Table 1, our baseline sample includes 634 unique state-year firms, 535 
unique state-year directors, and 694 firm-years in total. For 33 close elections, our sample 
includes 53 candidates and 28 unique states. This indicates that close elections are equally 
distributed among states with no close election cluster at state level.16 Instead of 66 top two 
contenders in 33 close elections, there are only 53 in our sample because some contenders are 
not connected (matched) to any firm whose headquarter is either in the election state or within 
500 miles from the state’s capital or to any director who graduates within five years of difference. 
Our yearly average (median) annual sample includes 77 (31) firm-year observations, 70 (30) 
unique firms, 59 (27) unique directors, 6 (2) contenders, and 4 (2) states.17    
Panel A of Table 2 reports firm, board, board network, election states, and candidate 
characteristics in our baseline sample. Firms in our sample has an average market capitalization 
of $5.16 billion, a market to book ratio of 1.15, and 13,830 employees. Among the connected 
firms, 14 percent are located in the very election states, while the remaining are located 230 miles 
from the election state’s capital on average. This average distance is comparable to the 250 miles 
requirement in Ivkovic and Weisbenner’ (2005) definition of local firms. The average board 
includes 8.91 directors of which 75% are independent directors. Directors are in majority male 
(82%) and 56 years old on average. In a connected firm, 1.37 directors (15% of board members) 
are connected to an election top-two contender. 85% of contenders are male, aged of 55.80 years, 
graduated from their university 33 years before the election year. Their last class reunion is 3 
years before their election.  
The number of local connected firms in our sample is determined by the number of 
close elections (5% of winner-loser vote margin or less), our corporate geographic requirement 
(firms in the election state or within 500 miles from the election state’s capital), and our 
                                                 
15 In Section 6.4 we discuss and test the case a firm is connected to a candidate by more than one director. 
Our main result is consistent. 
16 We do not include a few observations of firm that are connected to both the winner and the loser in a 
close election. In the sample’s period, out of 28 unique states, 6 have more than one close gubernatorial election 
(Minnesota (2006, 2010), Missouri (2000, 2004), Montana (2000, 2004), Oregon (2002, 2010), Rhode Island (2006, 
2010), and Vermont (2002, 2010)). The Montana 2000 close election is excluded as there are no firms connected to 
the two candidates based on our criteria. All states in our sample have a four-year gubernatorial term, except 
Vermont and New Hamphire with a two-year term. 38 states in the U.S. limit governors to two consecutive terms. 
17 As we do not include candidates that are not, by our definition, connected to any firms, the number of 
annual gubernatorial candidates reported in Table 1 can be an odd number, instead of an even number.    
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education linkage measure (directors and candidates graduated from the same school and the 
same degree within 5 years of difference). We note that the paper’s main findings are consistent 
after we vary each of these three requirements in various tables (i.e. Tables 3, 4, 5) and 
appendices (i.e. Appendices IA3, IA4, IA5). This indicates that there is no particular concern on 
the distribution of observations across elections, states, connected directors, candidates.   
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
Panel B of Table 2 compares our sample’s firm characteristics to firms in the 
BoardEx/Compustat universe in the same period. The sample firm’s average (median) market 
capitalization is $5.16 ($0.669) billion, in comparison to $2.856 ($0.418) billion for an average 
Boardex/Compustat firm. Although our sample firms are larger in average size, they are quite 
comparable in median size. This is not surprising given that our sample includes five connected 
firms with a market capitalization greater than $100 billion (General Electric Co. with $242.8 
billion, American International Group with $186.4 billion, IBM with 180.2 billion, Johnson and 
Johnson with 169.4 billion, and Merck with 127.1 billion). In a robustness check, we exclude 
these five firms and find consistent results. Our average firm has a market-to-book ratio of 1.15 
and age of 20.33 years, as compared to a market-to-book ratio of 1.90 and age of 18.08 years for 
an average Boardex/Compustat firm. 
4. DIRECTORS’ EXTERNAL NETWORKS AND FIRM VALUE:  STOCK PRICE REACTIONS 
In this section, we report our empirical results on the value of the external networks of 
directors as well as its variation with network, firm, and state characteristics. We also explore the 
value channels and the impact of director networks on major corporate decisions.  
4.1 THE EXTERNAL NETWORKS OF DIRECTORS AND FIRM VALUE 
To measure the impact of the external networks of directors on firm value, we rely on a 
regression discontinuity design of close gubernatorial elections in the U.S. The baseline 
regression is conducted on our sample of local connected firms (hence forth, connected firms) 
defined as 1) having at least one director who graduates from the same university campus and 
the same program within five years as one of the top two contenders in a close election; and 2) 
being headquartered in the election state or within 500 miles from the election state’s capital.  
Table 3 presents our estimation of the impact of the external networks of board 
members on firm value by relating stock price cumulated abnormal returns (CAR) of local 
connected firms around the election day to the winning status of the contenders (Winner 
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dummy). We use a nonparametric local polynomial regression to obtain the discontinuity effect 
at the exact threshold of 50%, by weighting observations with a Gaussian kernel function and 
controlling for separate quadratic polynomials of the vote shares of winners and losers (see 
Section 2 and appendix for further details.) Each observation pairs a firm’s director to one of the 
top two contenders in a close gubernatorial election, both of whom graduate from the same 
university campus and the same program (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008) within five years. 
We calculate CAR for every connected firm during a standard 3-day event period, from day -1 to 
day +1. The event day (day 0) is the election day reported by the respective State Election 
Commission, which is always a trading day. We first follow a conventional event study method 
to calculate the CAR resulting from close elections by assuming a single-factor model with the 
beta estimated from the pre-event window, and later use other methods of CAR estimation as 
robustness checks. Average abnormal returns are estimated based on the market model around 
the election day (Day 0). The market model is estimated using daily data over a 255‐day (‐315, ‐
61) window.  
Results from Table 3 show an overall significantly positive average effect of network 
connection to a close election’s winner on firm value. On our sample of local connected firms, 
column 1 reports a coefficient estimate of 4.1% on the Winner dummy, statistically significant at 
1%. This indicates that firms with a director socially connected to the winning contender exhibit 
CARs that are 4.1% over CARs of firms connected to the defeated contender. This is equivalent 
to an increase in firm value of $211.7 million and $27.4 million for our sample’s average and 
median firms, respectively. Connections through director networks are thus highly valuable for 
firms. Column 1’s regression will be used as our baseline regression throughout the paper. 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
In column 2, instead of clustering errors by election state as in column 1, we use two-way 
clustering of the standard errors to allow for error correlation across directors and across 
candidates.18 We obtain the same coefficient estimate of 4.1% as in column 1, significant at 5%. 
In columns 3 and 4, we run our baseline regression on the restricted samples of firms 
headquartered in the same state (97 firm-year observations) and within 100 miles from the state 
capital (170 firm-year observations), respectively. We obtain coefficient estimates of 3.7% and 
3.8%, significant at 5% and 1%, respectively, which are slightly lower that coefficient estimates in 
                                                 
18 This is different from, and in theory a lot more conservative than clustering by the pair director-
candidate (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2011). See section 6.7 and the appendix for additional tests and a 
discussion on inferences under RDD. 
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columns 1 and 2. We note that imposing more restrictive geographic conditions on our sample 
lead to a reduced number of observations and a more specific sample, reducing the power of our 
empirical tests and the generalizability of the results. This might explain the small difference in 
the magnitude of the estimates between columns 3 and 4 and columns 1 and 2.  
In column 5, we remove our stringent requirement on the geographic location of 
connected firms, no longer requiring that they are from the election state or within 500 miles 
from the state capital. The networks of firms connected to the candidates through school ties 
become significantly larger, including 1,301 firm-year observations. As expected with a larger 
network (longer network distance), the director network’s impact on firm value is smaller. The 
coefficient estimate on Winner is reduced to 0.8%, still significant at 5%.  
In column 6, we keep the same requirement on the location of connected firms as in 
column 1, but no longer require that directors and top two candidates graduate within 5 years of 
difference. They are now only alumni who graduate from the same university campus and the 
same program. The director-gubernatorial candidate networks also become larger, including 
1,995 firm-year observations, and are expected to be less valuable to firms. The finding in 
column 6 confirms this conjecture. The coefficient estimate on Winner is 3.0%, significant at 1%. 
Regressions in columns 1 to 6 show the difference in CARs between firms connected to 
winners and firms connected to losers. We can further decompose the benchmark result in 
column 1 into the impact of a win and that of a loss at the vote share threshold of 50% on a 
connected director’s firm. To do so, we apply the nonparametric regressions separately on 
subsamples of firms connected to winners and those connected to losers. Columns 7 and 8 
respectively report the regression intercepts of +0.1%, statistically insignificant, and -4.0%, 
significant at 1%, the difference of which makes exactly the effect of 4.1% found in column 1. 
The market appears to react to firms connected to losers much more in magnitude. 
If prior probabilities of winning are predicted at exactly 50% when vote shares tend to 
50%, one should expect equal market reactions of opposite signs to winner-connected and loser-
connected firms (see detailed analysis in the appendix). The large difference between the 
magnitude of reactions in columns 7 and 8 hints that the market may not have made a precise 
prediction of prior probabilities of winning, so the reactions are different between firms 
connected to winners and those connected to losers. It is reassuring that unlike event study 
methods, our RDD specification is robust to misperception of prior probabilities by the market, 
as shown in section 2 and the appendix. 
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As a check of robustness for our results in Table 3, we replicate our baseline regression, 
controlling for different degrees of polynomial of vote share, a large set of firm, director, and 
election characteristics, as well the number of connections. The results reported in appendix 
table A4 are comparable to those in Table 3 in the sign and magnitude of coefficient estimates 
(the only exception is perhaps column 7, when we control for various election characteristics.) 
This similarity in the magnitude of estimates is expected from the RDD framework in which the 
main estimate should not be affected by “irrelevant covariates” as the regression discontinuity 
accounts for all observable and unobservable characteristics. Indeed, when the treatment is 
comparable to a randomized experiment, any pre-treatment control variable must be 
independent of the treatment, thus its inclusion should not significantly alter the estimated 
magnitude of the treatment effect. Therefore, observed and unobservable characteristics of the 
elections, firms, and directors are irrelevant covariates and do not alter much our main estimate. 
In summary, Table 3 provides evidence that director network connections increase firm 
value. In an experiment based on close gubernatorial elections in the U.S. from 1999 to 2010, we 
estimate that the value of local firms with at least one director connected to a narrowly elected 
governor increases by 4.1% over and above firms connected to the narrowly defeated candidate. 
Consistent with social network theories, network value is reduced when the distance between 
network members is larger. These results are robust and consistent to various levels of standard 
error clustering and control variables for candidate, director, election, and firm characteristics.  
4.2 STRENGTH OF CONNECTIONS AND THE VALUE OF DIRECTOR NETWORKS 
Following Granovetter (1974), the strength of a director’s links is much relevant to the 
value the director could bring to the firm. Panel A in Table 4 reports results of the value of 
directors’ links based on link strength and social distance. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
In columns 1 to 3 in Panel A, we vary the time gap between graduation years of the 
director and his connected gubernatorial candidate, considered as proxy for the strength of their 
connection. Column 2 replicate the baseline regression (from column 1 of Table 3), in which the 
sample is restricted to pairs of director and close-election contender who have graduated from 
the same university campus and the same program and within five years of difference. Column 1 
strengthens this restriction by requiring each pair to have graduated in the same year. In contrast, 
column 3 relaxes the restriction to pairs that have graduated within 10 years of difference. 
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Directors’ firms are still required to be from the election state, or headquartered within 500 miles 
from the state capital. (The sample size decreases with the tightened restriction of connections.) 
As expected, the value of a director’s connection increases with the connection’s 
strength. As connection’s strength decreases from column 1 to 3, the estimated coefficient of 
Winner decreases from 5.0% to 4.1% and then 3.8% (all coefficients significant at 1%). The 
difference between the coefficients in columns 1 and 3 is statistically significant at 1% (but 
differences between columns 1 and 2, and between columns 2 and 3, are not statistically 
significant.) 
Another potential determinant of the strength and influence of alumni connections is the 
timing of alumni reunions (Shue 2013). We test the role of alumni reunions by running our 
baseline regression on two subsamples of firms based on whether their directors and connected 
election contenders belong to the same class cohort invited to annual alumni reunions. 19 
Columns 4 and 5 show that a director’s network value is significantly higher when directors and 
gubernatorial candidates belong to the same alumni reunion cohort, with a coefficient of 4.9% 
versus 2.0% when they do not. The difference between the two estimates is significant at 1%. 
When directors and election contenders’ schools do not organize class-based alumni meetings, as 
the result in column 6 shows, the coefficient on Winner is not significant. Overall, Panel A shows 
that stronger and more active connections of directors bring greater value. 
4.3 NARROW TARGETING AND THE VALUE OF DIRECTOR NETWORKS 
In Panel B of Table 4, we test whether a director’s external connection towards 
politicians are narrowly targeted towards his firm. As discussed in Section 2, we use a system of 
binary variables to control for broad-based benefits that a comparable firm may enjoy from a 
winning candidate. Columns 1 and 2 present results when we control for the overall effect of a 
winner’s election on all firms with a director who is an alumnus from the winner’s university 
with the dummy variable 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠. While the specification in column 1 restricts this 
average effect to be equal across all school, column 2 relaxes the restriction to allow a 
heterogeneous effect for each school by interacting 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠 with university fixed 
effects. This set of controls would also capture homophily effects that follow alumni who all 
chose a university based on its specific interests. The estimated coefficients of Winner remain 
                                                 
19 We obtain the information on how alumni reunions are organized in each of the university and school in 
our sample. The class cohort reunion system varies across universities. For example, a university might invite all 
alumni graduated in classes from 1985 to 1990 for a common annual alumni meeting in 2010. 
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sizeable at 4.1% and 3.1%, both significant at 1%, and quite close to the benchmark estimate, 
implying that most of the benefits are narrowly targeted to the connected firm. 
Columns 3 and 4 address broad targeting at the industry level, by controlling for the 
overall effect of a winner’s election on all firms in the same Fama-French classified industry as 
the director’s firm with the dummy variable 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠 . Column 3 restricts this average 
effect to be equal in all industries, and column 4 allows it to vary across industries by interacting 
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠 with industry fixed effects. The estimated coefficients of Winner remain strong 
at 4.1% and 3.3%, both significant at 1%. Finally, when we combine the two groups of control in 
column 5, in order to address all types of broad-based targeting and homophily effects, the 
estimated coefficient is still 2.9%, significant at 1%. It implies that a large part of the benefits are 
narrowly targeted to the connected firm. 
In summary, Panel B of Table 4 indicates that the effect of director networks on firm 
value is by and large narrowly targeted towards only the director’s firm. It is likely unaffected by 
homophily effects of shared characteristics among alumni. 
4.4 FIRM CHARACTERISTICS AND THE VALUE OF DIRECTOR NETWORKS 
In Table 5, we explore which local connected firms can best exploit the benefits from 
director networks by considering several firm characteristics. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
Since different categories of directors assume different roles, presumably the value of 
their networks is also different. In columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table 5, we run our baseline regression 
on subsamples of firms whose CEOs or board chairmen, independent directors, and executive 
directors, respectively, are connected to a top-two contender in close gubernatorial elections. We 
obtain coefficient estimates on Winner of 3.3%%, 3.4%, and 4.4%, significant at 5%, 1%, and 1%, 
respectively. The difference between coefficient estimates in columns 1 and 2 and in columns 1 
and 3 is however insignificant. The external networks of directors are thus valuable across 
different categories of directors, with no significant value difference among them. 
The value of director networks might depend on the size of their firm. We run our 
baseline regression on two subsamples of firms whose market capitalization is respectively above 
and below the median in our sample. Results reported in columns 4 and 5 show coefficient 
estimates of 5.7% and 3.6%, both significant at 1%, for small and large firms, respectively. The 
difference in coefficient estimates is significant at 1%. Director networks are thus valuable for 
both large and small firm, but significantly more valuable for smaller firms. 
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One of the most important tasks of a management team is to find the best financing 
solution to firm investments. We thus investigate whether the value of director networks is 
associated with a firm’s dependence on external finance. We construct Rajan and Zingales’s 
(1998) measure of dependence on external finance as (CapEx - Cashflow from 
Operations)/CapEx. Columns 6 and 7 of Table 5 report results on the two sub-samples of firms 
with above and below industry median scores. Firms more dependent on external finance exhibit 
a coefficient estimate of 6.7%, significant at 1%, while the estimate is 3.3%, also significant at 1%, 
for firms less financially dependent. The difference in coefficient estimates is significant at 1%. 
Director networks are thus valuable for financially dependent firms, and more valuable for them 
than for financially independent firms.20 
In summary, the results from Table 5 show that network connections of directors are 
valuable for firms across different types of directors, more valuable for smaller than for larger 
firms and for financially dependent than financially independent firms. Certain firms thus benefit 
from the networks of directors more than others. 
4.5 STATE CHARACTERISTICS AND THE VALUE OF DIRECTOR NETWORKS  
Table 4 has shown that the benefits firms enjoy from director networks are narrowly 
targeted, which suggests the possibility of firms using their director’s connection to strike deals 
with politicians in their states, rather than obtain legislations that could benefit many similar 
firms. To explore this mechanism, we investigate the value of director networks across different 
state characteristics and report results in Table 6. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
A high level of state regulations opens more room for targeted government intervention, 
therefore greater value for a firm to have social connections with the governor. Columns 1 and 2 
distinguish between states that have more or less than the median level of regulations. We rely on 
the index of state regulation in 1999 in Clemson University’s Report on Economic Freedom, 
available on http://freedom.clemson.edu (used in Glaeser and Saks 2006). It combines 
information on labor and environmental regulations and regulations in specific industries such as 
insurance. We find a positive estimate of 3.4%, significant at 1%, in states with high regulation. 
The estimate is negative and insignificant for states with low regulation. The difference in 
                                                 
20 If we partition our sample into two subsamples based on the industry average level of dependence on 
external finance, using Fama-French 10-industry classifications, we obtain comparable coefficient estimates. 
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coefficient estimates is significant at the 1% level, indicating that the value of networks is 
significantly higher for local connected firms in a highly regulated state. 
It follows that firms should benefit more from a director’s connection with the governor 
in states that have traditionally witnessed more corruption. In columns 3 and 4, we use Glaeser 
and Saks’s (2006) measure of corruption, computed from the number of convictions detailed in 
the Department of Justice’s “Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public 
Integrity Section” divided by state population size, and averaged from 1976 to 2002 to remove 
periodical noises. (It is not correlated with the regulation index.) In states with low corruption, as 
column 3 shows, the coefficient estimate on Winner is negative and insignificant. The effect is 
clearly stronger in magnitude and statistically significant (3.2%, significant at 1%) in more 
corrupt states. The difference in coefficient estimates is however insignificant, probably due to 
noises in the low corruption states. 
Finally, a local firm might draw more benefits from the connections of its directors to 
local politicians from powerful, large state governments. Columns 5 and 6 test this idea on the 
two subsamples of firms according to whether the share of state government employment over 
the state’s total employment is above or below the median national level. We find a positive 
estimate of 4.0%, significant at 1%, and insignificant coefficient, respectively, for these two 
subsamples. The difference in coefficient estimates is however insignificant. 
In sum, Table 6 provides evidence that the value of director connections is enhanced in 
states that are more regulated, more corrupt, and with a larger government. The evidence 
supports the concern that firms draw value from directors’ connections with governors through 
specific deals that prosper under the lack of transparency.  
5. LONG-TERM REAL OUTCOMES AND CHANNELS OF IMPACT 
Last section has shown evidence of narrowly-targeted benefits of director networks. This 
section will further explore their channels. According to Karlan et al.’s (2009) theory of social 
collateral in social networks, director networks are valuable because of the trust-based deals and 
information-sharing roles of networks. Both types of channels have been empirically 
documented in the extant finance literature. The trust-based channel relates to, for instance, 
Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons’ (2012) evidence that when a firm’s directors are connected to its 
corporate lenders, the firm pays a significantly lower interest. The information channel is 
supported by, for instance, Cohen, Frazzani, and Malloy’s (2008) evidence that when fund 
managers and CEOs of portfolio companies are connected, their investments enjoy better 
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performance and better exit timing. In what follows we focus on the direct, deal-based channel 
of state subsidies to connected firms. 
5.1 DIRECTOR NETWORKS AND STATE SUBSIDIES 
Directors’ networks may assist their firms in facilitating large investments (perhaps 
through outright financial help or cheap financing) or obtaining more and larger state financial 
and tax subsidies. Existing empirical support of this conjecture remains scant, with the exception 
of Goldman, Rocholl, and So’s (2013) evidence that former Republican (Democrat) politicians’s 
presence on corporate boards leads to a significant and large increase (decrease) in procurement 
contracts following the Republicans’ capture of Congress in 1994. We systematically estimate the 
impact of director networks on a wide range of firm outcomes, including state subsidies, 
corporate long term performance, access to financing, and corporate investment. 
We first investigate whether director networks help firms in winning state subsidies. We 
obtain data on state subsidies for firms in our sample from Good Jobs First website 
(http://www.goodjobsfirst.org).21 This website provides extensive details of economic subsidies 
and other forms of governmental financial assistance to U.S. businesses at both the state and 
federal levels. Its database covers our entire sample period and 1,858 parent companies with 
453,000 subsidy awards, of which 289,000 are either state or local and 164,000 are federal awards. 
Common subsidies include property tax abatements, investment tax credits, job creation tax 
credits, inventory tax exemption, sales, franchise, and use tax exemptions or reductions, lower 
utility rates, financial assistance through low interest loans and/or bond financing, and training 
grants. We use proxies for the probability of receiving state subsidies and subsidy dollar value as 
the dependent variable in our baseline RDD specification. Results are detailed in Table 7. 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
In columns 1 and 2 in Panel A, the dependent variable is an indicator for whether a local 
connected firm receives at least one state subsidy grant during the period of four fiscal years after 
and before a close election, respectively. The coefficient estimates on the Winner dummy in 
column 1 is 5.1%, significant at 1%. This indicates that, in comparison to firms connected to the 
losing candidate, local firms connected to the narrowly elected governor are significantly more 
likely to obtain a state subsidy grant following the election. In contrast, column 2 shows that 
there is no significant difference in the probability of obtaining states subsidies among these two 
                                                 
21 This website’s data have been officially achieved by the U.S. Library of Congress since 2013 and used by 
a number of academic papers. 
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groups of firms during the period of four years before close elections. The difference in 
coefficient estimates between column 1 and column 2, reported in column 3, is significant at 1%. 
The findings in columns 1 to 3 show that a director’s network connections significantly increase 
the likelihood that his/her firm receives a state subsidy grant. 
We further perform placebo tests in columns 4 to 6 on federal subsides, instead of state 
subsidies. As expected, none of the coefficient estimates is statistically significant. Hence 
network connections of local firms’ directors to local politicians do not affect the probability of 
obtaining federal subsidies. 
Panel B of Table 7 then focuses on important types of state subsidies, including state 
loans and tax credits. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is an indicator of whether a 
connected firm receives at least one state loan for the periods of four fiscal years after and four 
years before a close election, respectively. The coefficient estimates on the Winner dummy in 
column 1 is 4.4%, significant at 10%. By contrast, the estimate in column 2 is statistically 
insignificant. As reported in column 3, the difference in coefficient estimates between column 1 
and column 2 is significant at 1%. The findings in columns 1 to 3 show that a director’s 
networks significantly increase the likelihood that his/her firm receives state loans. Replicating 
the same regressions on the indicator of state tax credits in columns 4 to 6, we obtain 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar results. Director networks thus significantly increase the 
likelihood that firms receives state tax credits. 
Columns 7 to 9 further replicate regressions in columns 4 to 6, using as dependent 
variable the dollar value of state tax credits a local connected firm receives during the period of 
four fiscal years after and before a close election. The coefficient estimate on the Winner dummy 
in column 7 is $330,974, significant at 1%. This result indicates that a firm connected to the 
narrowly winning contender receives an average of $330,974 of tax credits more than a firm 
connected to a narrowly losing contender in the period of four years after the election. In 
contrast, the estimate in column 8 is negative and statistically insignificant, suggesting that there 
is no difference in tax subsidies between the two types of firms before the election. The 
difference in the estimates between column 7 and column 8, reported in column 9, is $374,478, 
significant at 1%. To the extent that tax credits are just the tip of an iceberg among many 
subsidies and favors, the real magnitude of subsides may be significantly higher in dollar value. 
We also check the sensitivity of our results in Table 7 with different proxies for state 
subsidies that differ in the forms and in the grant timing. Appendix table A7 reports consistent 
results on the positive impact of director networks on firms in terms of state subsidies.    
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5.2 DIRECTOR NETWORKS AND FIRM LONG TERM PERFORMANCE 
Our empirical tests have shown that director external networks are valuable to firm, 
measured by short-term cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). We next investigate if director 
networks wield impact on firms with respect to long term performance, financing decisions, and 
investment policies. Empirically, we replace the main dependent variable CARs in our baseline 
regression by various proxies for corporate outcomes subsequent to close gubernatorial elections. 
Results are reported in Table 8.   
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
Columns 1 to 3 in Panel A of Table 8 report our result on the impact of director 
networks on change in return on assets (ROA), between the election year and year one to year 
three following the election. We obtain coefficient estimates of 1.7%, 2.8%, and 7.0%, significant 
at 5%, insignificant, and significant at 1%, respectively. This result indicates that local firms with 
directors connected to a close election’s winner outperform to those connected to the loser in 
terms of ROA. The impact is statistically significant and economically important for the year 
following the election and for the period of three years after the election.  
Columns 4 to 6 in Panel A replicate the same regressions in columns 1 to 3, but using the 
market-adjusted long term stock performance with the holding period of one to three years 
following the election, respectively, as the dependent variable. We find coefficient estimates on 
the Winner dummy of 13.3%, 10.9%, and 22.2%, significant at 10%, 1%, and 5%, respectively. 
This finding shows that local firms with directors connected to a narrowly elected governor 
significantly outperform to those connected to narrowly defeated candidate in long terms stock 
performance. The impact is both statistically significant and economically important. 
5.3 DIRECTOR NETWORKS AND CORPORATE FINANCING POLICY 
We next investigate director networks’ impact on two of the most important corporate 
policies, namely corporate financing and investments. Panel B of Table 8 reports our results on 
financing policies. Columns 1 to 3 replicate our baseline RDD regression with post-election 
changes in access to bank loan as the dependent variable. Follow Almeida, Campello and 
Hackbarth (2009), we define access to bank loan as the number of loan facilities in DealScan 
dataset in which the loan primary purpose is "Corp. purposes", "Takeover", "Acquisition Line" 
or "Capital Expenditures." Our dependent variable is the difference in the number of bank loans 
between the election year and year one, year two, and year three after the election, respectively. 
The coefficient estimates on Winner dummy are 0.251, significant at 1%, 0.147%, insignificant, 
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and -0.215%, insignificant, respectively. The effect of director connections on access to bank 
loan is thus only significant in the year following the election. On average, a winner-linked firm 
has 0.25 loan facilities more than a loser-linked firm. 
Columns 4 to 6 of Panel B replicate the same regressions on the dollar value of loan 
facilities. We obtain coefficient estimates of 233.70, significant at 1%, 150.300, insignificant, and 
32.899, insignificant, respectively. Again, the effect of director connections on access to bank 
loan is only significant in the year following the election. The average firm with directors 
connected to the narrowly winning contender obtains $233.70 million in loan facility above the 
average firm connected to the loser. Thus, while the impact of director networks in term of the 
number of loan facilities seems to be fairly small, the impact is large in dollar terms. 
Next, columns 7 to 9 report results from our baseline RDD regression with post-election 
change in corporate loan spread as dependent variables. We rely on DealScan’s definition of loan 
spread as the difference in basis points between the weighted average loan interest and the Libor 
rate. Our dependent variables are the difference in loan spreads between the election year and 
year one to year three after the election, respectively. We obtain coefficient estimates of -3.07, 
insignificant, -17.45, significant at 1%, and -40.98, significant at 1%. Director connections appear 
to help firms substantially reduce the cost of debt after two to three years following the election. 
Finally, we investigate the impact of director networks on corporate borrowings. 
Columns 10 to 12 of Panel B replicate our baseline RDD regression with post-election changes 
in firm book leverage as the dependent variable. Book leverage ratio is calculated as (Debt in 
Current Liabilities + Long-Term Debt)/(Debt in Current Liabilities + Long-Term Debt + 
Common/Ordinary Equity), with all variables from Compustat. Our dependent variable is the 
difference in book leverage ratio between the election year, and year one, two, and three after the 
election, respectively. The coefficients on Winner are 2.6%, 6.3%, and 9.4%, all significant at 1%, 
respectively. This result indicates that following the election, winner-related local firms 
significantly increase their leverage, year by year, in comparison to loser-related local firms. 
5.4 DIRECTOR NETWORKS AND CORPORATE INVESTMENTS AND EMPLOYMENT 
We use a similar approach to investigate the impact of director networks on corporate 
investments by running our baseline regression using as dependent variable the difference in the 
Capex/Assets ratio between the election year, and year one, two, and three following the election, 
respectively. The Capex/Assets ratio in a given year is measured as the sum of a firm's capital 
expenditure and research and development expenditure normalized by start-of-the-year total 
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assets. Results are reported in Panel C of Table 8. In columns 1 to 3, the coefficient estimates on 
Winner dummy are 1.1%, significant at 1%, 1.1%, insignificant, and 1.6%, significant at 1%, 
respectively. Winner-linked firms thus increase their investment in comparison to loser-linked 
firms, especially one year and three year after the election. 
Changes in corporate investments may be accompanied by new hiring. Columns 4 to 6 of 
Panel C replicate the same regressions with changes in the numbers of employees in thousand as 
dependent variables. We obtain estimate coefficients of 1.723, 2.651, and 2.077, significant at 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively. Winner-related local firms thus increase significantly their staff 
number in comparison to loser-related local firms following the election. 
Overall, we find that winner-connected firms expand in investment and employment, 
perhaps partly due to the additional government subsidies and financing facilities mentioned 
above. The effect on employment could also reflect another type of quid pro quo deal, in which 
connected firms create more jobs to help the newly elected governor reduce local unemployment 
in their constituency (similar to Bertrand et al.’s 2008 finding among connected French firms.) 
In sum, results from Table 8 provide further evidence that director connections affect 
major corporate policies, including corporate financing and investing activities. Connected firms 
to the winners are also more likely to obtain state subsidies and better financing conditions. 
6. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND FALSIFICATION TESTS 
In this section, we conduct various robustness checks, including placebo tests, alternative 
specifications of the event studies, and RDD randomness checks.  
6.1 CHECKS OF RANDOMNESS 
Lee and Lemieux (2010) emphasizes RDD’s advantages in that one can check the near-
randomness of winning or losing a close election by applying the baseline specification on all 
predetermined variables to verify that they do not exhibit any discontinuity at the threshold. We 
perform those tests on our sample, and report supporting results in appendix table A3. 
Panel A of appendix table A3 reports RDD regressions using pre-event director 
characteristics as dependent variable, including age, gender, and board functions (chairman, 
CEO, executive, independent director). Panel B exhibits results of pre-event firm characteristics 
such as distance to the election state’s capital, firm size, market to book ratio, ROA, dependence 
on external finance, contribution to connected candidate, and number of connections. Panel C 
reports regression on pre-event firm outcome variables used in the paper such as stock return, 
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proxies for financing, ROA, Capex, and staff number. Panel D replicates the same regressions 
with pre-event candidate and state characteristics such as candidate age and gender, total 
donation, vote turnout, incumbent status, party, years since graduation, the degree of state 
regulation, state employment, and corruption conviction rate. None of the reported regressions 
produces a significant coefficient of the Winner dummy. Those tests thus confirm the RDD 
identification result that all predetermined variables do not exhibit discontinuities around the 
vote share threshold. 
6.2 VISUALIZATION OF DISCONTINUITY 
Following Lee and Lemieux’s (2010) advice to illustrate our regression discontinuity, we 
plot in Figure 1 the outcome variable, CAR(-1,+1), against vote shares, in bins of observations 
over intervals of 0.05% vote shares and with markers of bins above and below the 50% cutoff. 
We plot nonparametric estimates of CAR(-1,+1) as functions of vote share (using the same 
benchmark specification), where each half of the graph represents the estimated function for 
vote shares greater or less than 50% (i.e., for elected or defeated politicians, respectively). The 
bands represent confidence intervals at 90%. 
[Insert Figures 1 Here] 
While the nonparametric curves exhibit complex patterns, we see a large gap at exactly 
the 50% threshold that confirms our RDD estimates.22 The gap is driven mostly by observations 
on the losing side (below the 50% threshold), as also suggested in columns (7) and (8) of Table 3. 
As we will show in the next subsection, this pattern remains very stable over a broad range of 
bandwidths. 
6.3 SENSITIVITY TO BANDWIDTH SELECTION 
The RDD results can be sensitive to the choice of nonparametric specification, most 
importantly in terms of the bandwidth chosen in the nonparametric regression. Instead of 
picking Imbens and Kalyanaraman’s (2012) suggested optimal bandwidth (which tends to be too 
large for desired level of confidence – see Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014), we choose a 
prudent approach in examining a wide range of bandwidths in our nonparametric estimation 
procedure. The results are shown in Figure 2.  
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
                                                 
22 Since each bin may contain a different number of observations, some will have more importance in the 
nonparametric estimation, while others show up as outliers. 
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The estimated effect remains stable, and always significant at 10%, across all choices of 
bandwidth. Hence Figure 2 confirms the result that firms make significant gains in value 
following the elections of their connected governors. 
As an alternative method of estimation, we also implement Calonico, Cattaneo, and 
Titiunik’s (2014) correction for both the optimal bandwidth choice and the corresponding robust 
confidence intervals. Their approach yields an estimated coefficient on Winner of 3.6%, 
significant at 5%, and close to our baseline estimate of 4.1%. Our main result thus remains 
essentially unchanged. 
6.4 ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS OF THE EVENT STUDY 
The focus of our analysis is on the three-day event window, from -1 to +1. As this event 
window specification is simply one among several possibilities; we also consider our main 
specification using the (0,+1) alternative window. It produces sensibly similar results, which are 
available upon request. In our paper, cumulated abnormal returns are estimated based on the 
one-factor market model around the election day (Day 0). The market model is estimated using 
daily data over a 255-day (-315,-61) window. As a further check, we calculate the CARs using 
different methods, including the cumulative daily stock (raw) returns, Fama-French’s three-factor 
model (Fama and French 1993), and the four-factor model (Carhart 1997). Using these CARs in 
our RDD regressions, we find estimates mostly similar to those reported in Table 3. Results are 
available upon request. 
Earlier in section II, we have discussed the potential pitfall of event studies when there 
are concurrent events, and how our RDD cross-sectional identification addresses this problem, 
thanks to the near-randomness of the treatment variable in RDD. (We cannot use the very small 
sample of non-concurrent close elections, since they only take place under the rare case when the 
previous incumbent resigns or dies in office.) 
6.5 CONTROLLING FOR OTHER OBSERVABLES 
In an RDD, the event outcomes are near randomized at the threshold, so the inclusion 
of predetermined covariates should not affect the regression coefficients. We thus do not need 
to control for potential determinants of network value in our baseline regressions. In appendix 
table A4, we report robustness checks using various control variables in our baseline regressions. 
We start by controlling for different degrees of polynomials of vote share of the two 
close election contenders, from the first to the fourth, respectively in columns 1 to 4. We find 
comparable coefficient estimates in magnitude and significance. In columns 5 and 6, we include 
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all firm and director characteristics described in Panels A and B of appendix A3 as control 
variables, respectively. We obtain comparable coefficient estimates in terms of magnitude and 
statistical significance to our baseline regression. 
One may worry that contributions to electoral campaigns correlate with alumni 
connections, and further predict election results, even among close elections (Caughey and 
Sekhon 2011). Column 9 of Panel B in appendix table A3 first ascertains that pre-election 
campaign contributions do not exhibit a discontinuity at the threshold, so at the threshold 
winners and losers are similar in this dimension (in agreement with Eggers et al.’s 2015 response 
to Caughey and Sekhon 2011). In addition, in column 7 of appendix table A4, we replicate our 
baseline RDD regression while controlling for extensive election characteristics described in 
Panel D of appendix table A3, including individual connected firm contributions to each 
candidate in a close election. While the estimate is smaller than in our baseline result, it remains 
highly significant. Taken together, campaign contributions of connected firms do not 
significantly affect our conclusion on the value of director networks. 
In column 8 of appendix table A4 we control for another potential determinant of the 
value of director network, namely the number of directors from the same firm who are 
connected to a close election’s candidate. The estimate is 4.0%, significant at 1%, and practically 
identical to our baseline estimation. 
In brief, as expected in an RDD, the inclusion of many “irrelevant” covariates does not 
affect our results. This reassures the near-randomness of our design. 
6.6 ALTERNATIVE SAMPLES 
Firms in our sample must satisfy two conditions: 1) to have at least one director 
graduated from the same university campus and program with one of the two contenders in 
close gubernatorial elections, within five years of difference; 2) to be headquartered in the 
election state or within 500 miles from the election state’s capital. To ascertain that our results 
are not specific to this choice of sample, we vary the two sampling conditions and replicate our 
baseline RDD regression. Results are reported in appendix table A5. Columns 1 and 2 report 
results when the sample’s firms are headquartered in the election state or within 250 miles and 
100 miles from the election state’s capital, respectively. Winner’s coefficient estimates are 4.1% 
and 3.4%, both significant at 1%. Two remarks might arise here. First, the statistical significance 
of the results appears consistent to various geographic distance. Second, the magnitude of the 
results, however, varies a little. This variation might be caused by additional noises when sample 
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size is reduced (indeed, the differences between the estimates are not statistically significant), or 
by the imperfection of geographic distance as a proxy for potential network interactions between 
directors of local firms and alumni candidates. 
Columns 3 to 6 of appendix table A5 replicate our baseline regressions on samples of 
connected firms when vote margins are redefined as below 4%, 3%, 2%, and 1%, respectively. 
Because the nonparametric RDD specification estimates the effect at exactly the discontinuity 
point of 50% vote share, this choice of sample band should only affect the estimate’s precision. 
Across those columns, the estimated coefficients are 4.1%, 4.1%, 4.2%, and 3.8%, all significant 
at 1%, indeed all very close to our baseline estimate, albeit with slightly decreasing precision. 
Throughout our analysis, we use the most fundamental level of observation, each 
representing a connection between a firm, a director, and an election candidate around a specific 
election. We also examine more aggregated data at the level of director-election year and firm-
election year. Using the same baseline specification, the resulting coefficient estimates are 
respectively 4.5% and 4.7%, all significant at 1%. These coefficients are close to the benchmark 
result of 4.1%; their slight difference coming from each observation having a different weight 
under a different level of aggregation. 
6.7 DIFFERENT LEVELS OF STANDARD ERROR CLUSTERING   
Our regression results correct for standard error clustering at the level of election states, 
because the main regressor Winneri varies by each politician-election year combination, and that 
there can be potential autocorrelation over time. As the state is the most aggregated level 
possible, clustering by state is the most conservative (Cameron and Miller 2011). 
We further test the paper’s results under different possibilities of clustered standard 
errors. Column 2 of Table 3 shows that the result remains statistically significant at 5% even if 
the errors are allowed to be correlated across two dimensions, namely by directors and by 
candidates. As proposed by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2011, this is different from, and 
much more conservative than, clustering by the director-candidate pair (see implementation in 
appendix). Appendix table A6 further shows that the results are strongly robust to an extensive 
list of different levels of clustering, such as election year, school, candidate, director, firm, 
director-election year, and firm-election year. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
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Our paper provides evidence on the impact of the external networks of corporate 
directors on firm value and decisions. We focus on the alumni networks of directors and the top 
two contenders in close gubernatorial in the U.S. from 1999 to 2010 and use the Regression 
Discontinuity Design (RDD) of close elections to identify network value. 
We find that the external networks of directors positively and significantly impact firm 
value and decisions. Local firms with directors connected to a narrowly elected governor increase 
their value by 4.1% surrounding elections, equivalent to $211.7 million and $27.4 million for our 
sample’s average and median firms, respectively, over local firms connected to a closely defeated 
candidate. The benefits of connections are concentrated on the connected firms, possibly in quid 
pro quo deals, and not spread broadly to industry competitors, e.g., through industry-targeted 
policies. Consistent with social network theories, we find that the external networks of directors 
are more valuable to firms when connections are stronger and more active. Moreover, director 
networks wield real impact on firms. Subsequent to elections, firms connected to narrowly 
elected governors are more likely to receive state subsidies, loans, and tax credits. They receive 
more tax credits in dollar value, enjoy better access to bank loans, borrow more, and pay lower 
interest rate. They also invest more in capital and staff, and achieve better accounting and long 
term stock performance. Our results are robust to different specifications, to different measures 
of outcome variables, to different definitions of social network, and across many subsamples. 
By examining the importance of directors as connectors to the world outside the board, 
we join a few papers (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008, Butler and Gurun 2012, Engelberg et al. 2012) in 
complementing an extensive strand of literature on the monitoring and advisory roles of 
corporate boards within the boardroom. This emerging research direction calls for further 
research on the role of external director networks in other unexplored areas of corporate 
decisions. For example, it remains an open question how directors’ external connections interact 
with board nomination and composition, and directors’ participation in boards. Finally, director 
networks are only a dimension among many of the complex networks firms are embedded in, 
e.g., supply and financing networks, and it remains a challenge to understand theoretically and 
empirically how the different network dimensions interact. Our methodological contribution 
could help answer some of those research questions. 
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Table 1: Close Gubernatorial Elections 
This table reports the details and distribution of U.S. gubernatorial and close gubernatorial elections at 5% vote margin 
between 1999 and 2010. Our baseline sample includes local connected firms, defined as the ones that 1) have at least one 
director who graduates from the same university campus and the same university degree within five years of difference as 
one of the close election’s top two contenders; and 2) are headquartered either in the election state or within 500 miles from 
the election state’s capital. Each observation pairs a local connected firm to a connected candidate in close election. In the 
alumni-based sample, a firm is defined as connected if one of its directors and a close election’s candidate graduate from the 
same university program within five years (no geographic conditions are imposed). The last four rows present the time-
series statistics. 
 
 
Election 
Year 
Number of 
Elections 
Number of 
Close 
Elections 
Proportion 
of Close 
Election 
Average 
Winning 
Margin in 
Close 
Election 
 Baseline Sample  Alumni-Based Sample  
 
Obs Unique Firms  
Unique 
Directors Candidates States 
 
Obs Unique Firms  
Unique 
Directors Candidates States 
1999 3 1 0.333 0.011  7 7 6 1 1  9 9 8 1 1 
2000 11 2 0.182 0.023  13 13 11 2 2  34 34 26 2 2 
2001 2 0 0.000 -  - - - - -  - - - - - 
2002 36 11 0.306 0.031  207 195 159 15 10  663 487 431 21 11 
2003 3 1 0.333 0.039  2 2 2 2 1  12 12 9 2 1 
2004 11 4 0.364 0.017  52 46 49 7 4  162 147 130 7 4 
2005 2 0 0.000 -  - - - - -  - - - - - 
2006 36 3 0.083 0.024  60 54 48 5 3  118 112 84 5 3 
2007 3 0 0.000 -  - - - - -  - - - - - 
2008 11 1 0.091 0.035  31 30 27 2 1  59 56 39 2 1 
2009 2 1 0.500 0.038  16 16 10 1 1  47 45 27 1 1 
2010 37 10 0.270 0.014  306 271 223 18 10  891 729 594 19 10 
Total 157 34 - -  694 634 535 53 33  1,995 1,631 1,348 60 34 
                                
Mean 13.083 2.833 0.205 0.026  77 70 59 6 4  222 181 150 7 4 
Median 7 1 0.226 0.024  31 30 27 2 2  59 56 39 2 2 
Min 2 0 0.000 0.011  2 2 2 1 1  9 9 8 1 1 
Max 37 11 0.500 0.039  306 271 223 18 10  891 729 594 21 11 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of the Sample 
This table reports descriptive statistics of our sample. Panel A reports summary statistics of firms, boards, director networks, 
states, and election candidates in our sample. The variable definitions are reported in Appendix B. Our baseline sample 
includes local connected firms, defined as the ones that 1) have at least one director who graduates from the same university 
campus and the same university degree within five years of difference as one of the close election’s top two contenders; and 
2) are headquartered either in the election state or within 500 miles from the election state’s capital. Each observation pairs a 
firm’s director to one of the top two contenders in a close gubernatorial election, both of whom graduate from the same 
university campus and the same degree (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008) within five years of difference. Panel B shows 
descriptive statistics of firms in our sample and of firms in the BoardEx-Compustat merged database.  
  
38 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Median SD 
    
Firm Characteristics    
Market Capitalization (in Million) 5,163.16 668.87 16,001.51 
Dependence on External Finance -0.36 -0.72 1.34 
Market-to-Book 1.15 0.69 1.43 
Return on Asset 0.00 0.02 0.18 
Access into Bank Loan 0.60 0.00 1.26 
Facility Amount (in million) 303.53 0.00 897.98 
Book Leverage 0.40 0.36 0.34 
Loan Spread (in basis points) 34.26 0.00 75.09 
Capital Expenditure 0.04 0.02 0.05 
Number of Employee (in thousand) 13.83 1.90 35.66 
Same HQ and Election State (0/1) 0.14 0.00 0.35 
Distance from HQ to Election State Capital (in Miles) 230.13 188.45 154.11 
    Observations 694 
    
Board Characteristics and Director Networks    
Number of Directors 9.81 9.00 3.07 
Fraction of Independent Directors 0.75 0.79 0.15 
Executive Directorship (0/1) 0.21 0.00 0.41 
CEO (0/1) 0.13 0.00 0.33 
Chairman (0/1) 0.12 0.00 0.33 
Male Director (0/1) 0.82 1.00 0.39 
Director's Age 55.96 56.00 6.98 
Number of Directors Connected to Election Contenders 1.37 1.00 0.59 
Fraction of Directors Connected to Election Contenders 0.15 0.13 0.08 
Number of Directors Connected to Winning Contender 0.74 1.00 0.62 
Fraction of Directors Connected to Winning Contender 0.08 0.08 0.08 
    
Observations 694 
    
Contender and State Characteristics    
Male Contender 0.85 1.00 0.35 
Contender’s Age 55.80 57.00 6.09 
Incumbent (0/1) 0.15 0.00 0.36 
Time Since Graduation (in Years) 32.94 34.50 6.08 
Time Since Reunion (in Years) 3.06 1.00 7.08 
Regulation Index 6.32 6.35 0.51 
Conviction Rate Per Capita 0.30 0.27 0.17 
Fraction of State Government Employment 0.14 0.13 0.02 
Total State Level Donation in a State Election (in Million) 6.60 4.12 6.61 
Total State Level Donation by a Connected Firm 246.69 0.00 3,129.17 
    
Observations 694 
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Panel B. Sample Representativeness 
 
Baseline Sample  BoardEx-Compustat 
  Mean Median SD  Mean Median SD 
    
 
   Market Capitalization (in Million) 5,163 669 16,002  2,856 418 7,651 
Dependence on External Finance -0.358 -0.720 1.339  -0.162 -0.653 1.523 
Market-to-Book 1.152 0.690 1.428  1.897 0.872 5.853 
Return on Asset -0.002 0.022 0.183  -0.118 0.020 0.965 
Access into Bank Loan 0.598 0.000 1.260  0.610 0.000 1.195 
Facility Amount (in million) 303.529 0.000 897.984  184.938 0.000 493.339 
Book Leverage 0.401 0.361 0.338  0.333 0.291 0.511 
Loan Spread (in basis points) 34.258 0.000 75.088  44.801 0.000 93.203 
Capital Expenditure 0.038 0.022 0.050  0.053 0.025 0.098 
Number of Employee (in thousand) 13.832 1.900 35.663  7.917 0.975 20.280 
Firm Age 20.330 15.000 16.452  18.084 13.000 14.621 
Payout 177.711 14.559 342.659  110.127 2.467 344.962 
Cash Reserve Ratio 0.162 0.078 0.207  0.196 0.095 0.232 
Tangibility 0.198 0.109 0.219  0.222 0.125 0.243 
Sales and General Administration Ratio 0.287 0.208 0.288  0.385 0.222 0.901 
Interest Coverage 21.409 6.442 110.177  26.052 6.047 198.464 
Number of Directors 9.814 9.000 3.074  8.377 8.000 2.866 
Fraction of Independent Directors 0.749 0.786 0.151  0.692 0.714 0.185 
Total Number of Observations 694  31,880 
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Table 3: Directors’ External Networks and Firm Value in a Regression Discontinuity Design 
This table presents our RDD nonparametric estimation of the impact of the external networks of corporate directors on the value of their firm by relating 
stock price cumulated abnormal returns (CAR) of local connected firms around close gubernatorial elections in the U.S. between 1999 and 2010 to the 
winning status of their connected contenders. Each observation pairs a firm’s director to one of the top two contenders in a close gubernatorial election, if 
the director and the contender both graduate from the same university campus and the same degree (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008). Local connected 
firms are the ones that 1) have at least one such connected director; and 2) are headquartered either in the election state or within 500 miles from the 
election state’s capital. CAR are estimated based on the market model around the election day (day 0), using daily data over a 255‐day (‐315, ‐61) 
window. Winner is a dummy variable equal to one (zero) if the candidate wins (loses) the close election. A close election is specified by a winner-loser 
margin of votes of less than 5% based on their vote shares as a fraction of top-two candidate total votes. All regressions are implemented as Gaussian-
kernel weighted OLS, with bandwidth equal 0.005, controlling for the quadratic polynomials of vote shares of winners and vote shares of losers. Column 
1 presents results of the baseline regression. Column 2 clusters the standard errors two ways by both director and candidate. Columns 3 and 4 focus on the 
samples of firms that are headquartered in the election state and within 100 miles from the state’s capital, respectively. Column 5 uses the sample of firms 
that are headquartered neither in the election state nor within 500 miles from the election state’s capital. Column 6 considers a larger sample of local 
firms whose directors and a close election’s candidate graduate from the university campus and the same degree. Columns 7 and 8 report the results on 
the separate subsamples of winners and losers, respectively. Robust standard errors in square brackets are corrected for clustering by state. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variables: CAR (-1,1) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Samples Local Connected Firms  
Local Connected 
Firms 
Election 
State’s Firms  
Firms Within 
100 Miles 
Non-Local 
Connected Firms Alumni Sample Winners Losers 
              
  Winner 0.041 0.041 0.037 0.038 0.008 0.030 
  
 
[0.002]*** [0.020]** [0.016]** [0.011]*** [0.003]** [0.005]*** 
           Intercept 
      
0.001 -0.040 
       
[0.011] [0.010]*** 
         Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard Error 
Clustering Election State 
Two-Way 
Director-
Candidate 
Election State Election State Election State Election State Election State Election State 
R-squared 0.041 0.041 0.122 0.083 0.007 0.015 0.001 0.071 
Observations 694 694 97 170 1,301 1,995 393 301 
Unique Firms  516 516 296 79 951 1,317 343 246 
Unique Directors 483 483 343 80 901 1,249 312 207 
Unique Candidates 53 53 45 26 52 60 25 28 
Unique State 28 28 30 19 27 29 22 23 
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Table 4: Director External Networks’ Characteristics and Network Value 
This table presents our RDD nonparametric estimation of the impact of the external networks of corporate directors on the value of their firm by relating 
stock price cumulated abnormal returns (CAR) of local connected firms around close gubernatorial elections in the U.S. between 1999 and 2010 to the 
winning status of their connected contenders. Each observation pairs a firm’s director to one of the top two contenders in a close gubernatorial election, if 
the director and the contender both graduate from the same university campus and the same degree (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008). Local connected 
firms are the ones that 1) have at least one such connected director; and 2) are headquartered either in the election state or within 500 miles from the 
election state’s capital. CAR are estimated based on the market model around the election day (day 0), using daily data over a 255‐day (‐315, ‐61) 
window. Winner is a dummy variable equal to one (zero) if the candidate wins (loses) the close election. A close election is specified by a winner-loser 
margin of votes of less than 5% based on their vote shares as a fraction of top-two candidate total votes. All regressions are implemented as Gaussian-
kernel weighted OLS, with bandwidth equal 0.005, controlling for quadratic polynomials of vote shares of winners and vote shares of losers. Panel A 
reports the effects of directors’ connections by network strength. Columns 1 to 3 focus on firms whose directors and their connected candidates graduate 
in the same year, within 5 years, and within 10 years of difference, respectively. Columns 4 and 5 consider whether directors and candidates belong to the 
same class-based cohort invited to alumni reunions. Column 6 investigates directors’ schools that do not organize class-based cohort alumni reunions. 
Coefficient differences are tested using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions. Panel B reports tests of narrow targeting versus broad targeting/potential 
homophily effect. WinUniversity is a dummy variable equal to one if and only if any alumnus from the director’s university is elected on the same day. 
WinIndustry is a dummy variable equal to one if and only if a firm in the same industry (using Fama-French classification) is connected to a winner on 
the same election day. Columns 1 and 3 control for those variables separately, and columns 2 and 4 control for their respective interactions with 
university and industry fixed effects. Column 5 combines the two sets of controls. Robust standard errors in square brackets are corrected for clustering 
by state. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Panel A: Strength of Connections and Value of Director Networks 
                                                                                Dependent Variables: CAR (-1,1) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  
(4) (5) 
 
(6) 
Subsample Within 0 years Within 5 years Within 10 years   
Belong to the Class Cohort  Invited to an Alumni 
Reunion  No Class-Based Cohort Reunion     Yes No  Winner 0.050 0.041 0.038 
  
0.049 0.020 
 
-0.020 
 [0.004]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]***   
[0.008]*** [0.005]*** 
 
[0.047] 
Diff1 (1) - (2): 0.009 
   
(7) - (8): 0.029***   
χ2 1.83 
   
6.88   Diff2 
 
(2) - (3): 0.003    
   
χ2 
 
1.89    
   
Diff3 (1) - (3): 0.012***    
   
χ2 7.12 
   
   
Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes  Yes 
R-squared 0.503 0.041 0.040 
  
0.197 0.009 
 
0.013 
Observations 84 694 1,261     164 409   121 
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Panel B: Narrow Targeting and Network Homophily 
  Dependent Variables: CAR (-1,1) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) 
Winner 0.041 0.031 0.041 0.033 0.029 
 
[0.009]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]*** 
     
 
Vote Share 
(Winners) & Vote 
Share (Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Controls WinUniversity WinUniversity x  University FEs WinIndustry 
WinIndustry x 
Industry FEs 
WinUniversit) x 
University FEs & 
WinIndustry x Industry 
FEs 
R-squared 0.046 0.138 0.041 0.127 0.197 
Obs 694 694 694 670 670 
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Table 5: Firm Characteristics and Value of Director External Networks 
This table presents our RDD nonparametric estimation of the impact of the external networks of corporate directors on the value of their firm by relating 
stock price cumulated abnormal returns (CAR) of local connected firms around close gubernatorial elections in the U.S. between 1999 and 2010 to the 
winning status of their connected contenders. Each observation pairs a firm’s director to one of the top two contenders in a close gubernatorial election, if 
the director and the contender both graduate from the same university campus and the same degree (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008). Local connected 
firms are the ones that 1) have at least one such connected director; and 2) are headquartered either in the election state or within 500 miles from the 
election state’s capital. CAR are estimated based on the market model around the election day (day 0), using daily data over a 255‐day (‐315, ‐61) 
window. Winner is a dummy variable equal to one (zero) if the candidate wins (loses) the close election. A close election is specified by a winner-loser 
margin of votes of less than 5% based on their vote shares as a fraction of top-two candidate total votes. All regressions are implemented as Gaussian-
kernel weighted OLS, with bandwidth equal 0.005, controlling for the quadratic polynomials of vote shares of winners and vote shares of losers. Columns 
1 to 3 use firms in which the connected director is the CEO or chairman, an independent director, or an executive director, respectively. Columns 4 to 7 
focus on firms whose market capitalization is below and above the median size, whose reliance on external finance (Rajan and Zingales 1998) is below or 
above the median reliance on external finance, respectively. Robust standard errors in square brackets are corrected for clustering by state. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  Dependent Variables: CAR (-1,1) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) 
 
(6) (7) 
Subsample CEO and 
Chairman Independent Director Executive Director 
 Market Capitalization  Dependence on External Finance 
   Small Large  High Low 
Winner 0.033 0.034 0.044  0.057 0.036 
 
0.067 0.033 
 [0.014]** [0.006]*** [0.008]***  [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
 
[0.018]*** [0.002]*** 
          Diff1 (2) - (1): 0.001   0.021***  0.034** 
χ2 0.00   20.58  5.20 
          Diff2 (3) - (1): 0.011 
1.14 
      
χ2       
Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.074 0.029 0.122  0.067 0.084 
 
0.051 0.078 
Observations 128 491 144   331 339   347 347 
44 
 
Table 6: State Characteristics and Value of Director External Networks  
This table presents our RDD nonparametric estimation of the impact of the external networks of corporate directors on the value of their firm by relating 
stock price cumulated abnormal returns (CAR) of local connected firms around close gubernatorial elections in the U.S. between 1999 and 2010 to the 
winning status of their connected contenders. Each observation pairs a firm’s director to one of the top two contenders in a close gubernatorial election, if 
the director and the contender both graduate from the same university campus and the same degree (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008). Local connected 
firms are the ones that 1) have at least one such connected director; and 2) are headquartered either in the election state or within 500 miles from the 
election state’s capital. CAR are estimated based on the market model around the election day (day 0), using daily data over a 255‐day (‐315, ‐61) 
window. Winner is a dummy variable equal to one (zero) if the candidate wins (loses) the close election. A close election is specified by a winner-loser 
margin of votes of less than 5% based on their vote shares as a fraction of top-two candidate total votes. All regressions are implemented as Gaussian-
kernel weighted OLS, with bandwidth equal 0.005, controlling for the quadratic polynomials of vote shares of winners and vote shares of losers. Columns 
1 to 6 focus on firms whose state regulation index (based on Clemson University's Report on Economic Freedom in 1999), corruption convictions per 
capita (number of convictions in corruption cases pursed by the Department of Justice over state population, by Glaeser and Saks 2006), and government 
share of state employment (number of state employees over total number of employees in the state) are below or above the median level, respectively. 
Robust standard errors in square brackets are corrected for clustering by state. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
  Dependent Variables: CAR (-1,1) 
  (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
Subsample Regulation  Corruption Convictions Per Capita  Government Share of State Employment 
  Low High  Low High  Low High 
         
Winner -0.005 0.034 
 
-0.055 0.032  -0.141 0.040 
 [0.006] [0.003]*** 
 
[0.136] [0.004]***  [0.135] [0.004]*** 
         Diff -0.039***  -0.087  -0.181 
χ2 16.14  0.33  1.43 
         
Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.091 0.121 
 
0.008 0.081  0.016 0.086 
Observations 331 363   333 361   329 365 
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Table 7: Director External Networks and State Subsidies 
This table presents our RDD nonparametric estimation of the impact of the external networks of corporate directors on state subsidies of their firm by 
relating various proxies for state subsidies to local connected firms before and after close gubernatorial elections in the U.S. between 1999 and 2010 to 
the winning status of their connected contenders. Each observation pairs a firm’s director to one of the top two contenders in a close gubernatorial 
election, if the director and the contender both graduate from the same university campus and the same degree (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008). Local 
connected firms are the ones that 1) have at least one such connected director; and 2) are headquartered either in the election state or within 500 miles 
from the election state’s capital. CAR are estimated based on the market model around the election day (day 0), using daily data over a 255‐day (‐315, ‐
61) window. Winner is a dummy variable equal to one (zero) if the candidate wins (loses) the close election. A close election is specified by a winner-
loser margin of votes of less than 5% based on their vote shares as a fraction of top-two candidate total votes. All regressions are implemented as 
Gaussian-kernel weighted OLS, with bandwidth equal 0.005, controlling for the quadratic polynomials of vote shares of winners and vote shares of losers. 
Panel A reports the probability of receiving any of the state and federal subsidies for the periods of four years around close gubernatorial elections. Panel 
B shows the probability of receiving state loans and tax credits, as well the dollar value of state tax credits received during the periods of four years 
before and after close gubernatorial elections, respectively. Robust standard errors in square brackets are corrected for clustering by state. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: State and Federal Subsidy 
 
 
  
 
   Dependent Variables:  
 State Subsidies (0/1)  Federal Subsidies (0/1) 
 4 Years After Election 4 Years Before Election Change  4 Years After Election 4 Years Before Election Change 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
Winner 0.051 -0.003 0.053  -0.027 -0.028 0.001 
 [0.015]*** [0.003] [0.014]*** 
 [0.056] [0.056] [0.002] 
Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.048 0.022 0.047  0.032 0.027 0.019 
Observations 694 694 694  694 694 694 
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Panel B:  Types of State Subsidy 
  Dependent Variables: 
 State Loans (0/1)   State Tax Credits (0/1)   State Tax Credits (Dollar Value) 
 
4 Years After 
Election 
4 Years Before 
Election Change  
4 Years After 
Election 
4 Years Before 
Election Change  
4 Years After 
Election 
4 Years Before 
Election Change 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) (9) 
            
Winner 0.044 -0.006 0.050 
 
0.056 -0.003 0.059 
 
330,794 -43,684 374,478 
 [0.021]* [0.005] [0.018]*** 
 
[0.012]*** [0.003] [0.011]*** 
 
[62,060]*** [45,269] [57,197]*** 
Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
 
      
 
      
R-squared 0.027 0.030 0.025 
 
0.048 0.021 0.048 
 
0.049 0.023 0.047 
Observations 694 694 694   694 694 694   694 694 694 
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Table 8:  Director External Networks and Corporate Outcomes 
This table presents our RDD nonparametric estimation of the impact of the external networks of corporate directors on firms by relating various proxies 
for local connected firms’ performance, financing, and investments subsequent to close gubernatorial elections in the U.S. between 1999 and 2010 to the 
winning status of their connected contenders. Each observation pairs a firm’s director to one of the top two contenders in a close gubernatorial election, if 
the director and the contender both graduate from the same university campus and the same degree (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008). Local connected 
firms are the ones that 1) have at least one such connected director; and 2) are headquartered either in the election state or within 500 miles from the 
election state’s capital. CAR are estimated based on the market model around the election day (day 0), using daily data over a 255‐day (‐315, ‐61) 
window. Winner is a dummy variable equal to one (zero) if the candidate wins (loses) the close election. A close election is specified by a winner-loser 
margin of votes of less than 5% based on their vote shares as a fraction of top-two candidate total votes. All regressions are implemented as Gaussian-
kernel weighted OLS, with bandwidth equal 0.005, controlling for the quadratic polynomials of vote shares of winners and vote shares of losers. In Panel 
A, columns 1 to 3 present the impact of director networks on change in ROA between the election year and year one to year three after the election. 
Columns 4 to 6 present the impact of director networks on market-adjusted stock performance with holding periods of one to three years after the election. 
In Panel B, columns 1 to 3 show the impact of director networks on the number of bank loan facilities (Almeida, Campello, and Hackbarth 2011). 
Columns 4 to 6 show the impact of director networks on the dollar value of loan facilities. Columns 7 to 9 report the impact of director networks on loan 
spread. Columns 10 to 12 present the impact of director networks on book leverage. In Panel C, columns 1 to 3 report the impact of director networks on 
capital expenditure, measured as the ratio of capital expenditure over total assets at the beginning of each year. Columns 4 to 6 report the impact of 
director networks on the number of firm employees (in thousand). Robust standard errors in square brackets are corrected for clustering by state. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Firm Performance 
  Dependent Variables:  
 ROA   Market-Adjusted Holding Period Returns 
Change Year 0 to 1 Year 0 to 2 Year 0 to 3  1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
        Winner 0.017 0.028 0.070 
 
0.133 0.109 0.222 
 [0.007]** [0.019] [0.011]*** 
 
[0.070]* [0.017]*** [0.088]** 
Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.006 0.010 0.025 
 
0.063 0.068 0.079 
Observations 615 597 561   661 633 620 
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Panel B: Firm Financing 
  Dependent Variables:  
 Access to Bank Loan   Facility Sum (in $mil)   Loan Spread (Basis Points)   Book Leverage 
Change from 
Year 0 to: Year 1 Year 2 Year 3  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) (9) 
 
(10) (11) (12) 
                
Winner 0.251 0.147 -0.215 
 
233.700 150.300 32.899  -3.073 -17.450 -40.978  0.026 0.063 0.094 
 [0.040]*** [0.183] [0.376] 
 
[16.843]*** [176.1] [237.3]  [5.499] [3.517]*** [15.529]***  [0.006]*** [0.013]*** [0.031]*** 
Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.031 0.087 0.097 
 
0.045 0.071 0.069  0.055 0.024 0.045  0.009 0.020 0.021 
Observations 694 694 694   694 694 694   694 694 694   615 596 560 
 
Panel C: Firm Investments 
  Dependent Variables:  
 Capital Expenditure   Employment Change from 
Year 0 to: Year 1 Year 2 Year 3  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
        Winner 0.011 0.011 0.016 
 
1.723 2.651 2.077 
 [0.002]*** [0.008] [0.004]*** 
 
[0.393]*** [0.969]** [1.188]* 
Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.032 0.029 0.049 
 
0.033 0.038 0.024 
Observations 580 562 524   610 591 552 
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APPENDIX (ECONOMETRIC CLARIFICATIONS INTENDED FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION) 
In this appendix we provide details of the regression discontinuity design (RDD) of close 
elections based in large parts on Lee (2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010). The method was first 
suggested by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) and formalized by Hahn, Todd, and van der 
Klaauw (2001). Its relatively weak identification condition (vote share cannot be precisely 
determined by candidates) and its application in close elections were discovered and proven by 
Lee (2008). Details of the nonparametric estimation of RDD follow Imbens and Lemieux (2008), 
and the weighted average treatment effect interpretation comes from Lee and Lemieux (2010). 
In practice, Caughey and Sekhon (2011) and Grimmer et al. (2012) raise the concern of 
potentially non-random sorting of winners and losers in close elections to the U.S. House. In 
response, Eggers et al. (2015) uses a much larger sample of close elections to show that there is 
no evidence of sorting, and attribute Caughey and Sekhon’s findings to pure chance. 
Setting: For simplicity, let us index each observation by i. Suppose that the 
corresponding cumulative abnormal returns, CARi, is a function of the treatment variable, 
namely win/lose status, all observable characteristics Wi as well as unobservables Ui. The vote 
share of each candidate is also a function of Wi and unobservables Vi (while we assume linearity 
for simplicity, the results are much more general): 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖 = 𝛽𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖 + 𝑊 𝑖𝛾 + 𝑈𝑖, 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑊𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑊𝑊𝑖 = 𝑊𝑖𝛿 + 𝑉𝑖. 
Assume that conditional on W and U, the density of V is continuous. This assumption 
amounts to saying that each candidate cannot fully determine the exact vote share (partial 
influence on vote share is still allowed). Therefore, 𝑓𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑉|𝑊,𝑈(𝑥|𝑊,𝑈) , the probability 
density of vote share conditional on W and U, is continuous. Then the joint distribution of W 
and U conditional on vote share is also continuous in vote share, as: Pr[𝑊 = 𝑤,𝑈 = 𝑢|𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑊𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑊𝑊 = 𝑥] = 𝑓𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑉|𝑊,𝑈(𝑥|𝑊,𝑈) Pr [𝑊 = 𝑤,𝑈 = 𝑢]𝑓𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑉(𝑥)  
Because of this continuity, all observed and unobserved predetermined characteristics 
will have identical distributions on either side of the threshold, 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑊𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑊𝑊 = 50%: lim
𝑥↓50%
Pr[𝑊 = 𝑤,𝑈 = 𝑢|𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑊𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑊𝑊 = 𝑥] = lim
𝑥↑50%
Pr[𝑊 = 𝑤,𝑈 = 𝑢|𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑊𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑊𝑊 = 𝑥] 
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We can thus define and estimate the treatment effect as: 
𝛽𝑅𝑅𝑅 ≝ lim
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑉↓50%
𝐸(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖|𝑊𝑊𝑊) − lim
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑉↑50%
𝐸(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖|𝐿𝑉𝐿𝑊)= 𝐸(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖(𝑊𝑊𝑊) − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖(𝐿𝑉𝐿𝑊)|𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑊𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑊𝑊 = 50%). 
Estimation: The effect can be estimated by approximating CARi from both sides of the 
50% threshold of vote share, and take the difference. To do so, we implement a nonparametric 
estimation of 𝛽𝑅𝑅𝑅 by local polynomial regression: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖 + 𝑷𝒘(𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑊𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑊𝑊𝑖 − 50%)𝟏{𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑖≥50%}+ 𝑷𝒍(𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑊𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑊𝑊𝑖 − 50%)𝟏{𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑖<50%} + 𝜀𝑖, 
where 𝑷𝒘(. ) and 𝑷𝒍(. ) are two different second degree polynomials of 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑊𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑊𝑊𝑖  (without 
the constant) to be estimated. The estimator 𝛽𝑅𝑅𝑅�  is obtained from: min
α,β,Pw,Pl��𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖 − 𝛼 −  𝛽𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖 − 𝑷𝒘(𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑊𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑊𝑊𝑖 − 50%)𝟏{𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑖≥50%}
𝑖
− 𝑷𝒍(𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑊𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑊𝑊𝑖 − 50%)𝟏{𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑖<50%}�2𝐾 �𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑊𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑊𝑊𝑖 − 50%𝑏𝑤 �, 
where the kernel weight function 𝐾 �𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑖−50%
𝑏𝑏
� = 1
√2𝜋
exp �− 1
2
�
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑖−50%
𝑏𝑏
�
2
� is the 
probability density function of the standard normal distribution 𝒩(0,1) , and 𝑏𝑤  is the 
bandwidth (chosen at 0.005 in our benchmark specification). It is implemented by a kernel-
weighted OLS with the two polynomial controls. The local polynomial controls deal with the 
boundary bias in nonparametric kernel regressions. The method requires controlling for 
observed vote shares, not the vote share predicted by polls or markets. The combined local 
polynomial regression yields directly 𝛽𝑅𝑅𝑅� ’s standard error (Imbens and Lemieux 2008).
1 
This specification is equivalent to a two-step procedure of (1) two nonparametric 
estimations by local polynomial regressions of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖 = 𝐹(𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑊𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑊𝑊𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖, separately on the 
subsample where 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑊𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑊𝑊𝑖 < 50% to estimate the function 𝐹�−(. ), and on the subsample 
where 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑊𝑉ℎ𝑎𝑊𝑊𝑖 > 50% to obtain 𝐹�+(. ), and (2) calculate 𝛽𝑅𝑅𝑅�  as 𝐹�+(50%) − 𝐹�−(50%). 
In practice, the choice of the bandwidth may have considerable influence on the estimate 
(Calonico Cattaneo Titiunik 2014). To be conservative, instead of calculating the optimal 
                                                 
1 Other estimation procedures of RDD may differ in the choice of the bandwidth and the kernel function. 
For example, if one chooses a rectangular kernel function, the estimation is equivalent to an OLS regression on 
Winneri, controlling for two polynomials on both sides of the threshold, within a certain bandwidth. Our results are 
robust to many different specifications. 
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bandwidth (Imbens and Kalyanaraman 2012), we show that our results are robust for a large 
range of bandwidths. We also verified that results are robust to Calonico et al.’s correction. 
Generalizability: Moreover, if we let the effect be heterogeneous across observations, 
i.e., 𝛽(𝑊𝑖,𝑈𝑖)  with 𝑊𝑖  representing all observable and unobservable characteristics of each 
observation i, then the estimate can be rewritten as follows: 
𝛽𝑅𝑅𝑅 = �𝛽(𝑊,𝑈)𝑓(50%|𝑊,𝑈)𝑓(50%) 𝑑𝑑(𝑊,𝑈), 
where 𝑑(𝑊,𝑈)  is the cumulative joint distribution of (W,U), and the weight 𝑓(50%|𝑊,𝑈)
𝑓(50%)  
represents the ex-ante likelihood of the characteristics (W,U) to produce a close election. 𝛽𝑅𝑅𝑅 is 
thus a Weighted Average Treatment Effect across all possible observations. 
Inferences: Standard errors are calculated directly from the local polynomial regression. 
They are clustered by states, since the main regressor Winneri varies by each politician-election 
year combination, and that one needs to take into account potential autocorrelation over the 
years (as highlighted by Moulton 1990, Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004, and  reviewed 
by Cameron and Miller 2011.) As the state is the most aggregated level possible in this context, 
clustering by state is the most conservative (following Cameron and Miller 2011). The number of 
clusters is around 30. While one would need to worry about the issue of few clusters below this 
number, the simulated results by Cameron, Gehlbach, and Miller (2008) show that tests based on 
cluster-robust standard errors for 30 clusters still have very good size. To make sure that we stay 
on the conservative side, we try different levels of clustering in robustness tests, and find that the 
results remain particularly robust. 
The tests also include two-way clustering between directors and candidates, based on 
Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011), to allow for arbitrary error correlation among observations 
sharing the same director or sharing the same candidate. Accordingly, the formula of the two-
way clustering-robust variance covariance matrix of the vector of estimates is simply: 
𝑽𝑑⋁𝑝 = 𝑽𝑑 + 𝑽𝑝 − 𝑽𝑑⋀𝑝, 
where 𝑽𝒅 and 𝑽𝒑 are the variance covariance matrices of the vector estimates when corrected 
for clustering by directors and by candidates, respectively; and 𝑽𝑑⋀𝑝 is the variance covariance 
matrix of the vector estimates when corrected for clustering by pairs of director-candidate. 
Those matrices are obtained with standard regression tools. 
RDD Estimation with misspecified prior probabilities: The RDD by close election 
relies on a near-random cross-sectional identification; therefore it is robust to misspecification in 
event study such as misspecified prior probabilities of events. To illustrate this point, we take 
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from Cuñat Gine Guadalupe’s (2012) analysis of close votes on corporate governance 
provisions. Assume a candidate P in a close election, and after the election P-connected firms are 
valued at 𝑉 and 𝑉 depending on whether P wins or loses. The correct value of connections to P 
in office is 𝑉 − 𝑉 . Suppose that just before the election, the market expects P to win with 
probability 𝑝 , and to lose with probability 1 − 𝑝 . At that point, the expected value that is 
factored in P-connected firms’ stock price is 𝐸0(𝑉) = 𝑝𝑉 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑉. 
Market reaction amounts to 𝑉 − 𝐸0(𝑉) = (1 − 𝑝)(𝑉 − 𝑉) if P wins, and 𝑉 − 𝐸0(𝑉) =
−𝑝(𝑉 − 𝑉) if P loses. Hence an event study that considers only market reactions to P’s win 
would naturally underestimate the value of connection (0 < 𝑝 < 1), because the possibility of 
P’s win has been partly factored in connected stock prices. If one assume that the prior 
probability is 50%, it is possible to infer  𝑉 − 𝑉 from (1 − 𝑝)(𝑉 − 𝑉). This assumption can be 
tested by comparing market reactions (in absolute value to winner-connected firms with loser-
connected firms. 
In contrast, identification by RDD uses an estimate of the differences in market reactions 
between winner-connected firms and loser-connected firms, which is always 𝑉 − 𝑉 no matter 
what value 𝑝 takes. The use of CARs, while non-essential to our identification, nevertheless 
helps reduce market noises and improve estimation efficiency. In using RDD with cumulative 
abnormal returns, we get the best out of both cross-sectional and time-series methods. 
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Appendix Table A1: Candidate Details 
This appendix provides details of close gubernatorial elections in our sample. Turnout is the total number of votes for all the candidates in an election. Vote counts for 
winner and loser are the total number of votes for winner and loser, respectively. The vote percent is the percentage of votes a winner or loser receives among the top-two 
contenders in a close election. Incumbent refers to a candidate who seeks for a re-election. Margin of victory is the difference in vote percent between the top-two 
contenders in a close election. 
 
No. Election 
Date State 
Number Of 
Candidates Turnout 
Winner Loser 
Margin 
Of 
Victory Name Education  Party (A) Vote Count 
Vote 
Percent 
(A)/(A + B) 
Incumbent Name Education  Party (B) Vote Count 
Vote Percent 
(B)/(A + B) Incumbent 
1 2010-11-02 Connecticut 3 1,145,799 Dan Malloy Boston College (BA'77) Boston College (JD'80)   D 567,278 0.503 0 Tom Foley 
Harvard University (AB'75) 
Harvard University (MBA'79)   R 560,874 0.497 0 0.006 
2 2010-11-02 Florida 7 5,359,735 Rick Scott 
Southern Methodist University 
(JD'80) The University of 
Missouri-Kansas City (BBA'78)   
R 2,619,335 0.506 0 Alex Sink Wake Forest University (BA'70)    D 2,557,785 0.494 0 0.012 
3 2010-11-02 Illinois 5 3,729,989 Pat Quinn Georgetown University (BS'71) Northwestern University (JD'80)   D 1,745,219 0.505 1 Bill Brady 
Illinois Wesleyan University 
(BS'83)    R 1,713,385 0.495 0 0.009 
4 2010-11-02 Maine 5 580,538 Paul LePage Husson College (BS'71) University of Maine (MBA'75)   R 218,065 0.511 0 Eliot Cutler 
Georgetown University (JD'73) 
Harvard College (BA'68)   I 208,270 0.489 0 0.023 
5 2010-11-02 Minnesota 7 2,107,021 Mark Dayton Yale University (BA'69)    D 919,232 0.502 0 Tom Emmer 
University of Alaska at Fairbanks 
(BA'84) William Mitchell College 
of Law (JD'88)   
R 910,462 0.498 0 0.005 
6 2010-11-02 Ohio 4 3,852,469 John Kasich Ohio State University (BA'74)    R 1,889,186 0.510 0 Ted Strickland 
Asbury College (BA'63) Asbury 
Theological Seminary  (Mdiv'67) 
University of Kentucky (MA'66) 
University of Kentucky (PhD'80) 
D 1,812,059 0.490 1 0.021 
7 2010-11-02 Oregon 4 1,450,335 John Kitzhaber 
Dartmouth College (BA'69) 
Oregon Health & Science 
University (MD'73)   
D 716,525 0.508 0 Chris Dudley Yale University (BA'87)    R 694,287 0.492 0 0.016 
8 2010-11-02 Rhode Island 7 342,290 Lincoln Chafee Brown University (BA'75)    I 123,571 0.518 0 John F. Robitaille Providence College (BA'70) University of Utah  (MS'76)   R 114,911 0.482 0 0.036 
9 2010-11-02 South Carolina 4 1,344,198 Nikki Haley Clemson University (BS'94)    R 690,525 0.523 0 Vincent Sheheen 
Clemson University (BA'93) 
University of South Carolina  
(JD'96)   
D 630,534 0.477 0 0.045 
10 2010-11-02 Vermont 7 241,605 Peter Shumlin Wesleyan University (BA'79)    D 119,543 0.509 0 Brian Dubie University of Vermont (BS'82)    R 115,212 0.491 0 0.018 
11 2009-11-03 New Jersey 12 2,423,792 Chris Christie 
Seton Hall University (JD'87) 
University of Delaware - 
Wilmington (BA'84)   
R 1,174,445 0.519 0 Jon Corzine University of Chicago (MBA'73) University of Illinois (BA'69)   D 1,087,731 0.481 1 0.038 
12 2008-11-04 North Carolina 3 4,268,941 Bev Perdue 
University of Florida (ME d'74) 
University of Florida (PhD'76) 
University of Kentucky (BA'69)  
D 2,146,189 0.517 0 Pat McCrory Catawba College (BA'78)    R 2,001,168 0.483 0 0.035 
13 2006-11-07 Minnesota 6 2,202,937 Tim Pawlenty University of Minnesota (BA'83) University of Minnesota (JD'86)   R 1,028,568 0.505 1 Mike Hatch 
University of Minnesota (BS'70) 
University of Minnesota (JD'73)   DFL 1,007,460 0.495 0 0.010 
14 2006-11-07 Nevada 4 582,158 Jim Gibbons 
Southwestern University (JD'79) 
University of Nevada (BS'67) 
University of Nevada (MS'73)  
R 279,003 0.522 0 Dina Titus 
College of William and Mary 
(BA'70) Florida State University 
(Phd'76) University of Georgia 
(MA'73)  
D 255,684 0.478 0 0.044 
15 2006-11-07 Rhode Island 2 386,112 Donald Carcieri  Brown University (BA'65)    R 197,013 0.510 1 Charles J. Fogarty 
Providence College (BA'77) 
University of Rhode Island 
(MPA'80)   
D 189,099 0.490 0 0.020 
16 2004-11-02 Missouri 4 2,719,599 Matt Blunt United States Naval Academy (BA'93)    R 1,382,419 0.515 0 Claire McCaskill 
University of Missouri (BS'75) 
University of Missouri (JD'78)   D 1,301,442 0.485 0 0.030 
17 2004-11-02 Montana 4 446,146 Brian Schweitzer  
Colorado State University  
(BS'78) Montana State University 
(MS'80)   
D 225,016 0.523 0 Bob Brown  Montana State University (BS'70) University Of Montana (ME d'88)   R 205,313 0.477 0 0.046 
No. Election 
Date State 
Number Of 
Candidates Turnout 
Winner Loser 
Margin 
Of 
Victory Name Education  Party (A) Vote Count 
Vote 
Percent 
(A)/(A + B) 
Incumbent Name Education  Party (B) Vote Count 
Vote Percent 
(B)/(A + B) Incumbent 
18 2004-11-02 New Hampshire 2 666,280 John Lynch 
Georgetown University (JD'84) 
Harvard University (MBA'79) 
University of New Hampshire 
(BA'74)  
R 340,299 0.511 0 Craig Benson Babson College (BS'77) Syracuse University (MBA'79)   D 325,981 0.489 1 0.021 
19 2004-11-02 Washington 3 2,810,058 Christine Gregoire  
Gonzaga University (JD'77) 
University of Washington 
(BA'69)   
D 1,373,361 0.500 0 Dino Rossi Seattle University (BA'82)    R 1,373,232 0.500 0 0.000 
20 2003-11-15 Louisiana 2 1,407,842 Kathleen Blanco University of Louisiana at Lafayette (BA'64)    D 731,358 0.519 0 Bobby Jindal 
Brown University (BS'91) Oxford 
University (Mlitt'94)   R 676,484 0.481 0 0.039 
21 2002-11-05 Alabama 3 1,367,053 Bob Riley  University of Alabama (BA'65)    R 672,225 0.501 0 Don Siegelman 
Georgetown University (JD'72) 
Oxford University (Rhode 
Scholar'73) University of 
Alabama (BA'68)  
D 669,105 0.499 1 0.002 
22 2002-11-05 Arizona 4 1,226,111 Janet Napolitano Santa Clara University (BA'79) University of Virginia (JD'83)   D 566,284 0.505 0 Matt Salmon  
Arizona State University (BA'81) 
Brigham Young University 
(MA'86)   
R 554,465 0.495 0 0.011 
23 2002-11-03 Hawaii 6 385,457 Linda Lingle California State University (BA'75)    R 197,009 0.523 0 Mazie Hirono 
Georgetown University (JD'78) 
University of Hawaii (BA'70)   D 179,647 0.477 0 0.046 
24 2002-11-04 Maryland 3 1,706,179 Robert Ehrlich Princeton University (BA'79) Wake Forest University (JD'82)   R 879,592 0.520 0 
Kathleen 
Kennedy 
Townsend 
Harvard University (BA'74) 
University of New Mexico 
(JD'78)   
D 813,422 0.480 0 0.039 
25 2002-11-05 Michigan 4 3,177,565 Jennifer Granholm 
Harvard University (JD'87) 
University of California, Berkeley 
(BA'84)   
D 1,633,796 0.520 0 Dick Posthumus Michigan State University (BA'72)    R 1,506,104 0.480 0 0.041 
26 2002-11-07 Oklahoma 3 1,035,620 Brad Henry University of Oklahoma (BA'85) University of Oklahoma (JD'88)   D 448,143 0.504 0 Steve Largent  Tulsa University (BS'76)    R 441,277 0.496 0 0.008 
27 2002-11-05 Oregon 3 1,260,497 Ted Kulongoski University of Missouri (BA'67) University of Missouri (JD'70)   D 618,004 0.515 0 Kevin Mannix  
University of Virginia (BA'71) 
University of Virginia (JD'74)   R 581,785 0.485 0 0.030 
28 2002-11-05 Tennessee 15 1,653,167 Phil Bredesen Harvard University (BS'67)    D 837,284 0.516 0 Van Hilleary Samford University (JD'90) University of Tennessee (BS'81)   R 786,803 0.484 0 0.031 
29 2002-11-05 Vermont 10 230,012 Jim Douglas Middlebury College (BA'72)    R 103,436 0.515 0 Doug Racine Princeton University (BA'74)    D 97,565 0.485 0 0.029 
30 2002-11-05 Wisconsin 8 1,771,013 Jim Doyle 
Harvard University (JD'72) 
University of Wisconsin, Madison 
(BA'67)   
D 800,971 0.522 0 Scott McCallum 
Johns Hopkins University 
(MA'74) Macalester College 
(BA'72)   
R 732,796 0.478 1 0.044 
31 2002-11-05 Wyoming 3 185,459 Dave Freudenthal Amherst College (BA'73) University of Wyoming (JD'80)   D 92,662 0.510 0 Eli Bebout University of Wyoming (BS'69)    R 88,873 0.490 0 0.021 
32 2000-11-07 Missouri 7 2,346,830 Bob Holden Missouri State University (BS'73)    D 1,152,752 0.505 0 Jim Talent University of Chicago (JD'81) Washington University (BS'78)   R 1,131,307 0.495 0 0.009 
33 2000-11-07 Montana 3 410,192 Judy Martz Eastern Montana College (Associate'65)    R 209,135 0.520 0 Mark O'Keefe 
University of California-
Sacramento (BS'77) University Of 
Montana (MS'84)   
D 193,131 0.480 0 0.040 
34 2000-11-07 West Virginia 5 648,047 Bob Wise Duke University (BA'70) Tulane University (JD'75)   D 324,822 0.515 0 
Cecil H. 
Underwood 
Salem College (BA'43) West 
Virginia University (MA'52)   R 305,926 0.485 1 0.030 
35 1999-11-04 Mississippi 4 763,937 Ronnie Musgrove University of Mississippi (BA'78) University of Mississippi (JD'81)   D 379,033 0.506 0 Mike Parker William Carey University (BA'70)    R 370,691 0.494 0 0.011 
Appendix Table A2: Variable Definition 
Variable Name Description Data Source 
   Firm Characteristics   
Market-Adjusted Holding Period Returns Buy-and-Hold Cumulative Market-adjusted Stock 
Returns 
CRSP 
Market Capitalization (in Million) cscho * prcc_f Compustat 
Dependence on External Finance (capx - oancf)/capx Compustat 
Market-to-Book (cscho * prcc_f)/at Compustat 
Return on Asset ib/att-1 Compustat 
Book Leverage (dlc + dltt)/(dlc + dltt + ceq) Compustat 
Capital Expenditure capx/att-1 Compustat 
Number of Employee (in thousand) emp Compustat 
Research and Development xrd/att-1 Compustat 
Firm Age Total number of years since a firm first entry in 
Compustat 
Compustat 
Payout dvt + prstkc Compustat 
Cash Reserve Ratio che/at Compustat 
Tangibility ppent/at Compustat 
Sales and General Administration Ratio xsga/att-1 Compustat 
Interest Coverage oibdp/xint Compustat 
Access into Bank Loan Number of Loan facility in which the primary purpose 
is ("Corp. purposes", "Takeover", "Acquisition Line" or 
"Capital Expenditures") following Almeida, Campello 
and Hackbarth (2011) 
DealScan 
Facility Amount (in million) Facility amount DealScan 
Loan Spread (in basis points) Average loan spread (allindrawn) weighted by facility 
nominal amount, where loan spread is the stated 
interest rate above LIBOR. 
DealScan 
Number of Directors The number of directors in the firm BoardEx 
Fraction of Independent Directors The number of independent directors over total number 
of directors in the firm 
BoardEx 
Same HQ and Election State (0/1) Indicator variable equals one if a firm's headquarter is 
in the election state, and zero otherwise 
BoardEx/Compustat/Heider and Ljungqvist (2014) 
Distance from HQ to Election State Capital (in Miles) The distance between a firm's headquarter and the 
capital of the election state in miles 
BoardEx/Compustat 
Federal and State Subsidy Development subsidies and other forms of 
governmental assistance granted to companies at both 
the state and federal levels. The subsidies granted to 
subsidiaries are aggregated at parent entity. State 
subsidies include state tax credits, state grants, state 
financing, state megadeals, and state enterprise zones. 
Good Jobs First website 
(http://www.goodjobsfirst.org) 
   
Variable Name Description Data Source 
Board and Director Characteristics   
Number of External Connections to Gubernatorial 
Candidates 
The number of directors connected to a gubernatorial 
candidate in the firm 
BoardEx/Public Records 
Fraction of Directors Externally Connected to a 
Gubernatorial Candidate 
The number of directors connected to a winning 
gubernatorial candidate over total number of directors 
in the firm 
BoardEx/Public Records 
Number of External Connections to a Winning Gubernatorial 
Candidates 
The number of directors connected to a winning 
gubernatorial candidate in the firm 
BoardEx/Public Records 
Fraction of Directors Externally Connected to a Winning  
Gubernatorial Candidate 
The number of directors connected to a gubernatorial 
candidate over total number of directors in the firm 
BoardEx/Public Records 
Male Director (0/1) Indicator variable equals one if a director is a male, and 
zero otherwise 
BoardEx 
Director's Age Director's age BoardEx 
Executive Directorship (0/1) Indicator variable equals one if a director is an 
executive director, and zero otherwise 
BoardEx 
Independent Director (0/1) Indicator variable equals one if a director is an 
independent director, and zero otherwise 
BoardEx 
CEO (0/1) Indicator variable equals one if a director is the CEO, 
and zero otherwise 
BoardEx 
Chairman (0/1) Indicator variable equals one if a director is the 
chairman, and zero otherwise 
BoardEx 
   
State and Candidate Characteristics   
Regulation Index The index of regulation by state is measured for 1999, 
which combines information on labor and 
environmental regulations and regulations in specific 
industries such as insurance 
Clemson University's Report on Economic 
Freedom, http://freedom.clemson.edu. 
Conviction Rate Per Capita The ratio of convicted corruption cases by population 
size, averaged from 1976 to 2002 following Glaeser 
and Saks (2006) 
The Department of Justice’s “Report to Congress 
on the Activities and Operations of the Public 
Integrity Section” 
Fraction of State Government Employment The number of state employees over total number of 
employees in the state 
Public Records 
Male Candidate Indicator variable equals one if a candidate is a male, 
and zero otherwise 
Public Records 
Candidate's Age Candidate's age Public Records 
Total State Level Donation in a State Election (in Million) Total donations to a gubernatorial candidate in a state 
election cycle in million 
Good Jobs First website 
(http://www.goodjobsfirst.org) 
Total State Level Donation by a Connected Firm Total corporate donations by a connected firm to a 
gubernatorial candidate in a state election cycle 
Good Jobs First website 
(http://www.goodjobsfirst.org) 
Logarithm of Election Turnout Logarithm of election turnout State Election Records 
Incumbent (0/1) Indicator variable equals one if a candidate is an State Election Records 
Variable Name Description Data Source 
incumbent, and zero otherwise 
Time Since Reunion (in Years) The number of years since an election candidate last 
attends a school reunion. 
BoardEx/Public Records 
Time Since Graduation (in Years) The number of years since an election candidate 
graduates from a university 
BoardEx/Public Records 
Appendix Table A3: RDD Randomness Checks 
This table reports robustness checks of the near‐randomness of the winning/losing treatment induced by close gubernatorial elections between 1999 and 
2010. Each observation pairs a firm’s director to one of the top two contenders in a close gubernatorial election, if the director and the contender both 
graduate from the same university campus and the same degree (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008). Local connected firms are the ones that 1) have at 
least one such connected director; and 2) are headquartered either in the election state or within 500 miles from the election state’s capital.  Winner is a 
dummy variable equal to one (zero) if the candidate wins (loses) the close election. A close election is specified by a winner-loser margin of votes of less 
than 5% based on their vote shares as a fraction of top-two candidate total votes. All regressions are implemented as Gaussian-kernel weighted OLS, 
controlling for the quadratic polynomials of vote shares of winners and vote shares of losers. Each column aims to show that a dependent variable's 
distribution, measured before a close gubernatorial election, is continuous at the cutoff point of 50% vote share. Panel A reports the results on director 
characteristics (gender, age, executive directorship, independent directorship, CEO, and chairman.) Panel B reports regressions on firm characteristics 
such as geographic distance (headquarter in election state, in adjacent state, distance between headquarter and state capital in miles), market capitalization, 
market-to-book ratio, ROA, dependence on external finance, total donations by a connected firm to a candidate, number of directors connected per firm). 
Panel C presents results for the pre-election firm performance (buy-and-hold cumulative market-adjusted stock returns and ROA), financing activities 
(number of loan facility measured a la Almeida, Campello and Hackbarth (2011), book leverage, and average loan spread weighted by facility nominal 
amount, and investing activities (capital expenditure and employment). Panel D presents the results on candidate and election characteristics (gender, age, 
total donation, election turnout, incumbency, party affiliation, years since graduation, director-candidate belonging to the same cohort in alumni reunion) 
and state characteristics (state regulation, convictions rate, and government share of state employment). Robust standard errors in square brackets are 
corrected for clustering by state. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Director Characteristics  
Dependent 
Variable: Gender Age 
Executive 
Directorship 
Independent 
Directorship CEO Chairman 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Winner -0.170 1.618 0.014 -0.053 0.001 -0.101 
 
[0.182] [3.860] [0.047] [0.062] [0.037] [0.070] 
Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       R-squared 0.026 0.077 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.005 
Observations 694 694 694 694 694 694 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Proximity to State Capital  Firm Characteristics 
Same State Adjacent State HQ-Election State Capital Distance 
 Ln(Market 
Capitalization) 
Market-to-
Book ROA 
Dependence on 
External Finance 
Donation to 
Connected 
Candidate 
Number of 
Connections 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 (4) (5) (6) (7) (9) (10) 
                 
  Winner -0.044 -0.109 38.604  -0.377 0.420 -0.074 0.315 -3,224 -0.027 
 
[0.141] [0.142] [46.092]  [0.928] [0.286] [0.060] [0.287] [2,532] [0.122] 
Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
    
       R-squared 0.109 0.035 0.084  0.022 0.011 0.016 0.024 0.189 0.063 
Observations 694 694 694  662 622 622 670 694 694 
 
Panel C: Firm Outcomes 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Performance  Financing Activities  Investing Activities 
Prior 6-Month Holding 
Period Return ROA 
 
Access to Bank Loan Book Leverage Loan Spread 
 
Capital Expenditure Employment 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
 
            
  Winner 0.072 -0.074  -0.733 0.001 2.854  -0.005 -6.335 
 
[0.074] [0.060]  [0.452] [0.044] [13.965]  [0.014] [10.655] 
Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
   
       R-squared 0.037 0.016  0.008 0.004 0.009  0.012 0.005 
Observations 680 622  694 628 269  582 619 
 
Panel D: Candidates and State Characteristics 
Dependent 
Variable: Gender Age 
Total 
Donation Ln(Turnout) Incumbent Party 
Years Since 
Graduation 
Invitation to a 
Reunion as the 
Connected 
Director 
High 
Regulation 
High 
Convictions 
Per Capita 
High 
Government 
Share of State 
Employment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            Winner -0.176 0.413 -762,583 -0.276 -0.423 -1.351 2.524 -0.268 -0.222 -0.410 -0.182 
 
[0.258] [4.234] [5,535,858] [0.333] [0.355] [1.278] [3.778] [0.162] [0.281] [0.257] [0.291] 
Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            R-squared 0.136 0.046 0.123 0.098 0.046 0.114 0.059 0.191 0.121 0.143 0.084 
Observations 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 
 
Appendix Table A4: Controlling for Other Observables 
Controlling for various observables, including different vote share polynomials, firm, director, and election characteristics, and number of connections, 
this table presents our RDD nonparametric estimation of the impact of the external networks of corporate directors on the value of their firm by relating 
stock price cumulated abnormal returns (CAR) of local connected firms around close gubernatorial elections in the U.S. between 1999 and 2010 to the 
winning status of their connected contenders. Each observation pairs a firm’s director to one of the top two contenders in a close gubernatorial election, if 
the director and the contender both graduate from the same university campus and the same degree (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008). Local connected 
firms are the ones that 1) have at least one such connected director; and 2) are headquartered either in the election state or within 500 miles from the 
election state’s capital. CAR are estimated based on the market model around the election day (day 0), using daily data over a 255‐day (‐315, ‐61) 
window. Winner is a dummy variable equal to one (zero) if the candidate wins (loses) the close election. A close election is specified by a winner-loser 
margin of votes of less than 5% based on their vote shares as a fraction of top-two candidate total votes. All regressions are implemented as Gaussian-
kernel weighted OLS, with bandwidth equal 0.005, controlling for the quadratic polynomials of vote shares of winners and vote shares of losers. Columns 
1 to 4 control for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th degree polynomials of vote share of winners and losers, respectively. Column 5 controls for firm characteristics 
(market capitalization, market-to-book ratio, book leverage, ROA, and Fama-French 10 industry fixed effects). Column 6 controls for director 
characteristics (age, gender, executive directorship, independent directorship, CEO, and chairman). Column 7 controls for candidate characteristics (age, 
gender, total donation, and election fixed effects). Column 8 controls for the total number of directors connected to a gubernatorial candidate in a firm. 
Robust standard errors in square brackets are corrected for clustering by state. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.  
 
  
Dependent Variables: CAR (-1,1) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
        Winner 0.031 0.041 0.041 0.038 0.045 0.040 0.027 0.040 
 
[0.007]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]*** [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls 1st Degree Polynomial 
2nd Degree 
Polynomial 
3rd Degree 
Polynomial 
4th Degree 
Polynomial Firm Controls Director Controls 
Election 
Controls 
Number of 
Connections 
         R-squared 0.037 0.041 0.049 0.081 0.182 0.059 0.138 0.043 
Observations 694 694 694 694 615 694 694 694 
Appendix Table A5: Alternative Sample 
This table presents our RDD nonparametric estimation of the impact of the external networks of corporate directors on the value of their firm by relating 
stock price cumulated abnormal returns (CAR) of local connected firms around close gubernatorial elections in the U.S. between 1999 and 2010 to the 
winning status of their connected contenders. Each observation pairs a firm’s director to one of the top two contenders in a close gubernatorial election, if 
the director and the contender both graduate from the same university campus and the same degree (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008). Local connected 
firms are the ones that 1) have at least one such connected director; and 2) are headquartered either in the election state or within 500 miles from the 
election state’s capital (unless stated otherwise in columns 1 and 2). CAR are estimated based on the market model around the election day (Day 0), using 
daily data over a 255‐day (‐315, ‐61) window. Winner is a dummy variable equal to one (zero) if the candidate wins (loses) the close election. A close 
election is specified by a winner-loser margin of votes of less than 5% based on their vote shares as a fraction of top-two candidate total votes. All 
regressions are implemented as Gaussian-kernel weighted OLS, with bandwidth equal 0.005, controlling for the quadratic polynomials of vote shares of 
winners and vote shares of losers. Columns 1 and 2 focus on local connected firms that are headquartered in the election state or within 250 miles from 
the election state’s capital, and in the election state or within 100 miles from the election state’s capital, respectively. Columns 3 to 6 consider 4%, 3%, 
2%, and 1% vote margin, respectively. Robust standard errors in square brackets are corrected for clustering by state. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Subsamples: Election State OR  Within 250 Miles 
Election State OR  
Within 100 Miles 4% Vote Margin 3% Vote Margin 2% Vote Margin 
1% Vote 
Margin 
      
    Winner 0.041 0.034 0.041 0.041 0.042 0.038 
 
[0.002]*** [0.008]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
R-squared 0.046 0.081 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.048 
Observations 404 193 657 457 238 179 
Appendix Table A6: Different Levels of Standard Error Clustering 
Correcting for various levels of clustering, this table presents our RDD nonparametric estimation of the impact of the external networks of corporate 
directors on the value of their firm by relating stock price cumulated abnormal returns (CAR) of local connected firms around close gubernatorial 
elections in the U.S. between 1999 and 2010 to the winning status of their connected contenders. Each observation pairs a firm’s director to one of the top 
two contenders in a close gubernatorial election, if the director and the contender both graduate from the same university campus and the same degree 
(Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008). Local connected firms are the ones that 1) have at least one such connected director; and 2) are headquartered either 
in the election state or within 500 miles from the election state’s capital. CAR are estimated based on the market model around the election day (Day 0), 
using daily data over a 255‐day (‐315, ‐61) window. Winner is a dummy variable equal to one (zero) if the candidate wins (loses) the close election. A 
close election is specified by a winner-loser margin of votes of less than 5% based on their vote shares as a fraction of top-two candidate total votes. All 
regressions are implemented as Gaussian-kernel weighted OLS, with bandwidth equal 0.005, controlling for the quadratic polynomials of vote shares of 
winners and vote shares of losers. Columns 1 to 13 cluster the standard errors by election year, election state, election, candidate, director, company, 
school, director-company, candidate-election year, director-election year, company-election year, school-election year, and candidate-director-company-
school-election year, respectively. Column 14 clusters the standard errors two ways by both firm and candidate. Standard errors in square brackets are 
robust. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
  
Dependent Variables: CAR (-1,1) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
                
      
  
Winner 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 
 
[0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.015]*** [0.017]** [0.018]** [0.011]*** [0.017]** [0.015]*** [0.017]** [0.018]** [0.011]*** [0.020]** [0.020]** 
Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Election Year 
Election 
State Election Candidate Director Company School 
Director-
Company 
Candidate-
Election 
Year 
Director-
Election 
Year 
Company-
Election 
Year 
School-
Election 
Year 
Candidate-
Director-
Company-
School-
Election Year 
Two-Way 
Candidate 
Company 
R-squared 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 
Observations 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 
Appendix Table A7: Director Networks and State Subsidies 
This table presents our RDD nonparametric estimation of the impact of the external networks of corporate directors on state subsidies of their firm by 
relating various proxies for state subsidies to local connected firms before and after close gubernatorial elections in the U.S. between 1999 and 2010 to 
the winning status of their connected contenders. Each observation pairs a firm’s director to one of the top two contenders in a close gubernatorial 
election, if the director and the contender both graduate from the same university campus and the same degree (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008). Local 
connected firms are the ones that 1) have at least one such connected director; and 2) are headquartered either in the election state or within 500 miles 
from the election state’s capital. CAR are estimated based on the market model around the election day (day 0), using daily data over a 255‐day (‐315, ‐
61) window. Winner is a dummy variable equal to one (zero) if the candidate wins (loses) the close election. A close election is specified by a winner-
loser margin of votes of less than 5% based on their vote shares as a fraction of top-two candidate total votes. All regressions are implemented as 
Gaussian-kernel weighted OLS, with bandwidth equal 0.005, controlling for the quadratic polynomials of vote shares of winners and vote shares of losers. 
Panel A and C report the respective levels and change in state and federal subsidies two and six years, respectively, around close gubernatorial elections. 
Panel B and D show the levels and change in specific type of state subsidy received two and six years, respectively, around close gubernatorial elections. 
Subsidies are development subsidies and other forms of governmental assistance, aggregated at parent entity, granted to companies. State and federal 
subsidy are indicator variables equal one if a firm receives a subsidy from state and federal government, respectively, and zero otherwise. Robust 
standard errors in square brackets are corrected for clustering by state. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Panel A: State and Federal Subsidy Two-Years around Elections 
  Dependent Variables:  
 State Subsidy (0/1)   Federal Subsidy (0/1) 
 2 Years After Election 2 Years Before Election Change  2 Years After Election 2 Years Before Election Change 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
        Winner 0.050 -0.003 0.053 
 
-0.027 -0.027 0.000 
 [0.015]*** [0.003] [0.014]***  
[0.056] [0.056] [0.000] 
Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
 
      
R-squared 0.048 0.021 0.047 
 
0.032 0.032 0.004 
Observations 694 694 694   694 694 694 
 
Panel B: Types of Subsidies Two-Years around Elections 
  Dependent Variables: 
 State Loan (0/1)   State Tax Credit (0/1)   State Tax Credit (Dollar Value) 
 
2 Years After 
Election 
2 Years Before 
Election Change  
2 Years After 
Election 
2 Years Before 
Election Change  
2 Years After 
Election 
2 Years Before 
Election Change 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) (9) 
            Winner 0.047 -0.006 0.053 
 
0.056 -0.003 0.059 
 
33,108 -1,658 34,766 
 [0.019]** [0.005] [0.016]***  
[0.012]*** [0.003] [0.011]*** 
 
[6,101]*** [2,913] [6,290]*** 
Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
 
      
 
      
R-squared 0.024 0.030 0.024 
 
0.048 0.021 0.048 
 
0.048 0.021 0.034 
Observations 694 694 694   694 694 694   694 694 694 
Panel C: State and Federal Subsidy Six-Years around Elections 
  Dependent Variables:  
 State Subsidy (0/1)   Federal Subsidy (0/1) 
 6 Years After Election 6 Years Before Election Change  6 Years After Election 6 Years Before Election Change 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
        
Winner 0.121 -0.003 0.124 
 
-0.027 -0.028 0.001 
 [0.029]*** [0.003] [0.029]*** 
 
[0.056] [0.056] [0.002] 
Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
 
      
R-squared 0.063 0.022 0.061 
 
0.032 0.027 0.019 
Observations 694 694 694   694 694 694 
 
Panel D: Types of Subsidies Six-Years around Elections 
  Dependent Variables: 
 State Loan (0/1)   State Tax Credit (0/1)   State Tax Credit (Dollar Value) 
 
6 Years After 
Election 
6 Years Before 
Election Change  
6 Years After 
Election 
6 Years Before 
Election Change  
6 Years After 
Election 
6 Years Before 
Election Change 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) (9) 
            Winner 0.114 -0.006 0.120 
 
0.129 -0.003 0.132 
 
645,444 -43,684 689,129 
 [0.035]*** [0.005] [0.032]*** 
 
[0.028]*** [0.003] [0.028]*** 
 
[116,873]*** [45,269] [105,819]*** 
Vote Share 
(Winners) & 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
 
      
 
      
R-squared 0.049 0.030 0.045 
 
0.076 0.021 0.075 
 
0.049 0.023 0.049 
Observations 694 694 694   694 694 694   694 694 694 
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